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Abstract 
During the course of Reconstruction both the Supreme Court and the lower level federal 
courts faced the task of interpreting Reconstruction legislation, including the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Enforcement Acts.  By the end of Reconstruction 
the Supreme Court had defined these groundbreaking pieces of legislation in a conservative 
manner that negatively impacted the former slaves.  The lower-level courts, however, had 
embraced earlier opportunities to broaden the nationalistic meaning of these Amendments. One 
such opportunity was United States v Hall.  This trial level court case initially expanded the 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of African Americans. The Hall Case 
was one of the great “might have beens” in U.S. Constitutional history.  
This study analyzes Ku Klux Klan violence leading up to the Eutaw riot and the 
subsequent court case, U.S. v Hall.  Conflict broke out during a pre-election political rally when 
Democrats and Republicans met simultaneously at the Greene County, AL, Court House. The 
riot resulted in the federal government’s attempts to prosecute the rioters under the Enforcement 
Act of 1870.  The Hall case was one of the first in which federal judges interpreted the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Federal prosecutors challenged the judges to make a broad, 
nationalistic interpretation, which would have enabled the federal government to protect the 
rights of the former slaves for the long haul.  What—exactly—were the privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship?  Did the Fourteenth Amendment apply the Bill of Rights to 
the states?  Are these rights protected against the state governments?  These are the issues 
Attorney General John P. Southworth and Circuit Court Judge William Woods tackled in the 
federal trial.  
 Ultimately, the government failed to secure a conviction of the rioters but set a strong 
precedent in Judge Woods’ opinion for later federal courts to establish the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s connection to the Bill of Rights. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to 
follow the precedent. This analysis provides historians a better understanding of the work of the 
lower level federal courts’ and their contribution to the constitutional issues of Reconstruction.  
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Introduction – “No State Shall”  
 The history of the United States is filled with defining moments. Moments that changed 
the direction of the country’s future. The foundation of America’s legal system was built on the 
United States Constitution. The ever-evolving development of the Constitution gave the federal 
courts the opportunity to create many of those defining moments, sometimes to the benefit of the 
United States and sometimes to its detriment. Eutaw, Alabama presented the courts with one 
such opportunity midway through Reconstruction, in 1870. United States v Hall could have been 
a turning point in Reconstruction. The case developed a nationalistic and broad interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act, a precedent which the Supreme Court 
could have followed. This broad interpretation would have protected the rights granted to blacks 
in the Bill of Rights. Unfortunately however, U.S. v Hall became a prime example of what could 
have happened during Reconstruction.  
 U.S. v Hall provided the courts the first opportunity to legitimize the efforts of the 
Republican Congress. To provide true equal rights to the newly freed slaves, the Fourteenth 
Amendment had to be linked to the Bill of Rights to provide the freedmen with the same rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution. U.S. v Hall gave the federal courts the opportunity 
to define the rights of citizenship and begin to turn around the racial subjugation the country was 
founded on. Before Hall no other Fourteenth Amendment case had been brought to the federal 
courts. Hall created a brief opportunity where anything was possible. The interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment had yet to be formed. The courts could generate an interpretation that 
would expand Democracy to all citizens of the nation, or destroy the chance for black citizens to 
obtain equal rights under the law. Federal Circuit Judge William B. Woods rose to the occasion 
with a resounding affirmation of federal rights under the newly minted Fourteenth Amendment. 
2 
Woods’ opinion of the defense team’s preliminary motion ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment 
made the provisions of the Bill of Rights enforceable against both states and individuals. The 
federal court according to Woods, was well within its authority to prosecute the perpetrators—
evidently members of the Ku Klux Klan—for denying Republicans their First Amendment rights 
to free speech and assembly. Woods’ opinion provided a broad national foundation on which the 
federal courts could continue to build constitutional doctrine and a rule of law strong enough to 
provide an enduring democratic society. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court did not take 
up the precedent that Woods had provided. Instead the nation’s High Court decided on a narrow 
interpretation of federal rights in the Slaughterhouse Cases—one which left the constitutional 
authority of the national government little changed from its Pre-Civil War  understanding. 
Instead of the legal foundation for a strong central government, US v. Hall became one of the 
great “Might Have Beens” in American history.   
 Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction therof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”1 Since its ratification on July 9, 
1868, this section has been one of the most debated sections in all of the United States 
Constitution. The battle over three words in particular, “privileges and immunities,” began 
almost immediately. This controversy developed into a great legal battle during Reconstruction.  
                                                 
1
 U.S. Constitution, 14
th
 Amendment, sec. 1. 
3 
 The fate of Reconstruction hinged on defining this term. What exactly were the privileges 
and immunities of U.S. citizenship? The Fourteenth Amendment created a platform through 
which the federal government could enforce the rights and regulations identified by the Bill of 
Rights. After Congress created the new Amendment they found it needed legislative support. 
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the express power to enforce the 
Amendment with appropriate legislation.
2
 Thus, in hopes of controlling the rampant Ku Klux 
Klan violence in the South, Congress developed the first Enforcement Act of 1870, which was 
implemented on May 31, 1870. This new law required that any citizen who qualified to vote 
under the Constitution could not be prevented from voting due to “color, race, or previous 
condition of servitude.”3 The Act went on to negate any previous law in direct conflict with the 
new Act by stating, “any constitution, law, custom, usage or regulation of any State or Territory, 
or by or under its authority to the contrary notwithstanding.”4 The Act targeted both individual 
and state action. The framers recognized that not only did individuals prevent the freedmen from 
exercising their right to vote, but the southern states did nothing to prevent these individuals 
from interfering. Thus the Enforcement Act outlawed action on the part of individuals. Section 
six of the Act outlawed riding or conspiring on public roads with the aim to prevent any person 
from exercising their rights granted by the Constitution. This statute also included punishment 
for preventing citizens from exercising any rights granted by the Constitution. Section seven of 
the Enforcement Act linked ordinary state crimes with federal civil rights violations. While a 
                                                 
2
 U.S. Constitution, 14
th
 Amendment, sec. 5. 
3
 Enforcement Act of May 30, 1870. Quoted in Wang Xi, The Trial of Democracy: Black Suffrage and Northern 
Republicans, 1860-1910, Appendix One (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 267; Lou Falkner 
Williams, The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871-1872 (Athens, The University of Georgia Press, 
1996), 41.  
4
 Enforcement Act of May 30, 1870. Quoted in Wang Xi, The Trial of Democracy), 267. 
4 
person could not be tried in federal court for a state crime, such as a murder or assault, he could 
be tried for a federal civil rights violation committed along with the state offense.
5
 For example, 
if assault or murder was committed to keep some persons from voting, the federal crime was the 
civil rights violation not the assault. By linking these two crimes, the federal government could 
use the punishment for the state crime as the punishment for the civil rights violation. Therefore, 
if a state allowed execution for a crime, a Klansman could be put to death for a federal civil 
rights violation.
6
 This Act gave the federal government more power under Constitutional 
doctrine to bring Klansmen to justice. Yet to be useful and valid the Enforcement Act had to be 
authorized through the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It needed to be 
considered constitutionally valid, because for the Act to be effective the courts had to recognize 
that the Fourteenth Amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states.   
The North and the South had just finished fighting an emotionally searing and brutal war, 
one that had percolated under the surface of the United States for a half a century before the 
shooting began. Yet, the physical wounds of war healed more rapidly than the emotional and 
cerebral injuries caused by a desolated society. The Civil War crushed the white South. The men 
who survived came back to war ravaged lands. The war starved and exhausted the women. 
Children faced the dawn of a new nation, a new democratic society with which they were 
unfamiliar.  People became confused, but most of all they feared the outcome of the war. They 
looked ahead to a completely unfamiliar nation. The laws they had lived by, both social and 
legal, written and un-written, changed drastically. Radical Republicans took power from 
                                                 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Williams, Ku Klux Klan Trials, 41. 
5 
southern whites and, in southern Democrats’ eyes, gave it to the freedmen.  This exchange of 
power sent a wave of fear and anger across the South which southerners took out on blacks.  
Because of this fear, Congress faced great opposition from many southerners. White 
southerners lived in a different social sphere than many of their northern counterparts. The 
traditions and values of the South were decidedly different. Southerners, specifically southern 
Democrats, viewed the forced implementation of these new Reconstruction regulations as an 
insult to their honor. Southerners valued their honor and tradition above all things and in their 
opinion, they were being forced to follow the laws of a foreign nation, laws that directly 
challenged their southern way of life. To white southerners the master had become the slave, and 
the slave the master. They believed it was a great insult to be considered an equal to any former 
slave, an insult they could not tolerate.
7
 
Overall, southern Democrats believed the newly ratified state constitutions, 
Reconstruction Amendments, and Enforcement Acts were all unconstitutional and therefore must 
be illegitimate. Historian Lou Falkner Williams describes the underlying argument of 
southerners saying, “If legitimate government rested on the consent of the governed, if 
republican government depended upon the participation of the virtuous and intelligent members 
of the polity, if the purpose of government was to foster the welfare of the entire community, if 
government was responsible for protecting property rights, then [southerners] were living under 
an ‘absolute despotism.’”8  Yet, because of the Democrats’ absolute intransigence, Republicans 
were forced to implement harsher and more strident legislation thus creating a vicious circle with 
both social and legal ramifications. Rather than define exactly what “privileges and immunities” 
                                                 
7
 Wyatt-Brown, Bertram, Southern Honor: Ethics and Behavior in the Old South: 25
th
 Anniversary Edition 
(Cary: Oxford University Press, 2007), 365. 
8
 Williams, Ku Klux Klan Trials, 14. 
6 
would be in all situations, Republicans relied on the Supreme Court to define any vague terms. 
As legal historian William Nelson explains of Republicans, “While they could take pride in their 
success in elaborating and incorporating important moral principles such as equality and 
rationality into the Constitution, they made only slight headway in the task of applying those 
principles to specific cases in accordance with some consistent scheme. But that task was not 
primarily theirs. Rather, it would belong to the Supreme Court of the United States in the 
decades that followed the adoption of the amendment.”9 
Southern Democrats and northern Republicans disagreed fundamentally about the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Southern Democrats argued that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “no state shall” provisions applied only to state action, not individuals’ actions. 
Moreover the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection did not include the first ten amendments to 
the United States Constitution. Conversely Republicans believed the Enforcement Act gave 
Congress the ability to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus enforce the Bill of Rights 
against both state and individual actions. But the entire argument hinged on the three words 
“privileges and immunities.” What exactly were the privileges and immunities of national 
citizenship? 
 While the federal courts waited to define the legal doctrine behind the legislation, white 
southerners fought back. Fear and anger in the Black Belt of Alabama were as bad as or worse 
than any other area of the South. The Ku Klux Klan had infiltrated the heart of the state. 
Through racism and a desire for political control, the Klan had successfully used intimidation 
methods to subdue the Republican Party within both the Union Leagues and the Freedmen’s 
                                                 
9
 William Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1988), 147. 
7 
Bureau. This intimidation and political control assisted the Klan and the Democrats in 
suppressing any power that Congress rightfully granted to the Republicans and freedmen of the 
South. Through voter intimidation and violence the Klan successfully influenced elections and 
controlled key politicians. With the Eutaw Riot the federal government faced its first opportunity 
to define privileges and immunities in the Fourteenth Amendment. Using the Enforcement Act, 
the federal government attempted to prosecute individuals who violated the new Reconstruction 
Amendment.  It was the first federal case to attempt to define both the new Fourteenth 
Amendment and the companion Enforcement Act. Though the Supreme Court failed to follow its 
precedent, United States v. Hall (1871) demonstrates what might have been in terms of a broad 
judicial interpretation of the Reconstruction legislation. This federal circuit court in Alabama 
presented the opportunity for the federal government to legitimize the Fourteenth Amendment 
and its direct link with the Bill of Rights.  However, the Supreme Court refused to follow the 
Hall precedent, a development that was especially devastating when the Court’s narrow decision 
in Slaughterhouse proved to be a major blow to equal rights in the United States. Hall also 
demonstrates the difficulty in prosecuting Klansmen with the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Enforcement Act when the South’s social and legal traditions unlawfully trumped those of the 
federal government. The small town of Eutaw in Greene County, as a whole, provides a 
microcosm in which to view the larger legal landscapes of Reconstruction, because the events in 
the small Alabama town show the direct effect of the new legislation on southern citizens.  
One of the most tempestuous counties in the state, Greene County, is situated near the 
western border of Alabama.
10
 Greene County is considered a part of the Black Belt in Alabama. 
                                                 
10
 Allen W. Trelease, White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 246. 
8 
Historian Jonathan Weiner describes the Black Belt as “a tier of counties whose undulating 
terrain stretched across south-central Alabama. The name derived from its soil (dark, alluvial) 
and came to symbolize its population (slaves greatly outnumbered whites) and its culture 
(wealthy planters fashioned a plantation civilization, a cotton kingdom that was almost a state 
within a state).”11 Within the Black Belt and within Greene County, the town of Eutaw saw 
tremendous amounts of violence at the hands of white Democrats directed toward both black and 
white Republicans. The years from 1866 through 1872 presented multiple opportunities in the 
town of Eutaw to judicially manifest the goals of southern Reconstruction. The state government 
proved to be incapable of enforcing laws and keeping order, so the responsibility fell to the 
federal government to enforce the new Legislation of Reconstruction, including the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendment as well as the Enforcement Act. Because of a lack of social 
cooperation, political designs, and continued racial upheaval, these opportunities ultimately 
proved to be disappointments on the judicial level.  
These opportunities came in several forms: A release of federal prisoners, a murder of a 
high-profile Republican and, finally, a riot in the center of the town. Yet, even with all of these 
opportunities no permanent judicial action occurred, therefore citizens of the South garnered no 
respect for the new federal legislation. This lack of respect for federal authority was true across 
the entire South. The events and outcomes in Eutaw were mirrored in the events and outcomes of 
Reconstruction, as a whole. The state did not easily acquiesce to the laws of the federal 
government; hence southern tradition proved stronger than federal law. The Klan became more 
powerful than the courts.  
                                                 
11
 Jonathan M. Wiener, Social Origins of the New South Alabama, 1860-1885 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1987), 78. 
9 
Alabama has always been included in any regional study of Reconstruction. However, 
very little work has been done on specific areas and towns within the region. It is important to 
look at the effects of Reconstruction on a smaller scale, so historians have specific evidence with 
which to analyze the broad scope of Reconstruction. Through analyzing the events of 
Reconstruction this study will demonstrate the great difficulty the federal government faced in 
U.S. v. Hall and illuminate why the federal government ultimately failed to establish true 
Democracy. 
The first chapter of this study focuses on the failure of military and governmental control 
in Alabama, and across the South. The military failed at gaining control and respect of white 
citizens, and therefore any hope of social change diminished. The chapter also exhibits the 
shameless disregard for the new state government and the extra-legal laws which they 
represented in the form of a blatant murder by the Ku Klux Klan. The town of Eutaw proved to 
be a hotbed of political and racial activity. In March 1868 fifteen white Democrats were taken 
into custody after attacking a white Republican schoolteacher, Joseph Hill. These white 
Democrats, possibly either Klansmen themselves or Klan sympathizers, likely assailed Hill 
because the teacher came from the North to teach black school children. In the eyes of 
Democrats this Carpetbagger had overstepped his bounds and needed to be put in his place. 
However, the issue, the defendants claimed, came from an unpaid bill for firewood.   
The men attacked Hill in broad daylight forcing him from a store into the street and then 
later that night several threatened him at his home. While Hill was not seriously injured, he did 
leave town and report the events to the Freedman’s Bureau.  The military government in place at 
the time saw it as a violent attack based purely on politics. Within two months of the attack, in 
May 1868, a military court tried and convicted Hill’s assailants who were then sent to the Dry 
10 
Tortugas for imprisonment. The prison had a reputation for being a hellish place, and the public 
protested the conviction emphatically. A mere two weeks after the prisoners were convicted 
General George Meade, the head of the U.S. military district, astonishingly pardoned the 
prisoners.  
If the goal of the military district was to keep order and to help adjust the South to this 
revolutionary new political way of life— why would Meade pardon these men? 12 Meade 
claimed that he reacted to social outrage, but under the circumstances the citizens of the South 
could not be trusted to make the proper decisions for Reconstruction. The men faced no further 
consequences for their actions and the citizens realized they had power over the military leader. 
The military occupied the South, under the Military Reconstruction Act of 1867, until 
each state ratified a new state constitution that outlawed slavery ratified the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, and provided for Black suffrage. Alabama struggled with the terms set 
by the federal government. Not only did white Alabamians battle against the federal legislation, 
and specifically the ratification of a new state constitution, but they fought against the military 
occupation that they viewed as unnecessary. Alabama and Eutaw’s lack of respect for the 
legitimacy of the Fourteenth Amendment foreshadowed events that transpired over Eutaw in the 
next two years.  
Just over a year after the prisoners returned home violence broke out again. On March 31, 
1870, a gang of masked men violently and openly murdered Alexander Boyd, the white 
Republican county solicitor, in the middle of the night. Boyd had garnered attention after 
declaring his plans to bring to justice the murderers of two black men who were killed earlier in 
                                                 
12
 William Warren Rogers Jr., “The Eutaw Prisoners: Federal Confrontation with Violence in Reconstruction 
Alabama,” The Alabama Review: A Quarterly Journal of Alabama History 43, (April 1990): 89-121. 
11 
the year. The black men were accused of killing a white Democrat, but instead of having a fair 
trial they were taken from the prison and murdered. Boyd vowed to find the men who dared take 
state prisoners from a prison and enact punishment without due process.  
Even with many witnesses to Boyd’s murder and the sheriff being called to the scene 
immediately, no guilty parties were ever found. The grand jury allegedly could find no evidence 
to try any individual, and the state courts dropped the case. The citizens of the town either 
refused to implicate anyone out of reciprocity with the Klan or out of fear of retribution. William 
Miller, Boyd’s uncle and a Republican state probate judge, later reported his own fears of 
violence against himself should he have testified.
13
  
Through actions like the murder of Alexander Boyd, federal government officials 
realized that they had no power to physically punish the Klan or any violators of the new 
Reconstruction Amendments.  Because the Fourteenth Amendment only provided the 
government with the opportunity to create legislation to enforce the rights of citizens, Congress 
had to enact a separate law which would give it the means of prosecuting both individual 
Klansmen and states which officially violated rights of the freed people. With the passage of the 
Enforcement Acts government officials believed they had created the legislation they needed to 
bring violators of the Reconstruction Amendments to justice. In addition to the First 
Enforcement Act, the Third Enforcement Act, of April 20, 1871, or the Ku Klux Klan Act, made 
it a felony to conspire to deny any citizen of their civil rights or any “privilege or immunity” and 
right protected by the Constitution of the United States. This Act also allowed the president to 
suspend Habeas Corpus and required jurors in the trials of any Enforcement Act cases to take an 
                                                 
13William Warren Rogers, “The Boyd Incident: Black Belt Violence During Reconstruction,” Civil War History 
21 (December 1975):309-329. 
12 
oath that they had never been party, voluntarily or involuntarily, to any Klan activities.
14
 The 
Justice Department started aggressively prosecuting individuals across the South under the 
Enforcement Acts. The Supreme Court, however, had yet to weigh in on the debate whether the 
Constitution backed the Enforcement Act or not. The Courts needed to legitimize the Act for the 
southern states to accept it.  
Chapter Two analyzes the Eutaw Riot, involving Democrats and Republicans, as well as 
the difficulties of bringing white southerners to justice under the Reconstruction Amendments. 
The new legislation Congress implemented to help bring criminals to justice directly impacted 
both the riot and the following failure of the state justice system. Seven months after members of 
the Ku Klux Klan killed Alexander Boyd, a political riot broke out at the courthouse in Eutaw. 
Democrats and Republicans both held political rallies within yards of each other on the same 
day. With political tension in the air and citizens anticipating the following month’s election, 
gunshots broke out and a mass riot began. The details were never completely sorted out, because 
the witnesses divided quite clearly along party lines. Whites were brought to trial in federal court 
in United States v. Hall, but the trial stalled because of a lack of cooperation by witnesses who 
feared violence.  One of those witnesses was a United States Congressman, Charles Hays, who 
resided in the town of Eutaw.  Hays, a former Confederate soldier and now considered a 
Scalawag Republican, refused to testify. 
15
 Eventually the Justice Department forced Hays into 
testifying against the Democratic defendants in the case. 
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 Enforcement Act of April, 20, 1871 Quoted in Wang Xi, The Trial of Democracy, 288-291; Williams, Ku 
Klux Klan Trials, 42. 
15Melinda Meek Hennessey, “Political Terrorism in the Black Belt: The Eutaw Riot,” The Alabama Review: A 
Quarterly Journal of Alabama History 33 (January 1980): 35-48. 
13 
U.S. v. Hall, one of the earliest Fourteenth Amendment cases, required the Justice 
Department to use the first Enforcement Act of 1870 to indict the defendants. Chapter Three 
delves deeper into the legal impact of Reconstruction and the federal court case that stemmed 
from the riot. The Reconstruction Amendments and the Enforcement Act, while meant to help 
the Republicans bring Democrats to justice, failed. These failures had far-reaching impacts on 
the legal history of Reconstruction as a whole.  Federal Circuit Judge William B. Woods, who 
heard the case, knew that this particular case, the first to be tried under the newly merited federal 
regulations, had the potential to define the legal doctrine surrounding the Enforcement Act, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Bill of Rights. Woods consulted with Justice Joseph P. Bradley 
of the United States Supreme Court in hopes of adequately defining the law. The correspondence 
between the two judges and Judge Woods’ opinion to the court and to the jury provided a broad 
nationalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that defined and incorporated the Bill 
of Rights’ meaning into all three pieces of legislation. In other words Woods defined citizenship 
and rights via the Fourteenth Amendment. This opinion gave blacks the same rights as their 
white counterparts. Woods believed the privileges and immunities provided by the Fourteenth 
Amendment were in fact the same rights protected by the Bill of Rights. With this link 
established blacks could then expect the protection of the federal government from both the state 
and individuals trying to prevent the freedmen from exercising their rights. 
 State governments were never likely to actively protect black citizens, but the broad 
nationalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment gave the federal government the 
authority to circumvent the states and to fully protect all aspects of black citizens’ rights by 
providing protection from both state action and individual action. When the federal courts 
refused to follow the Hall precedent in Slaughterhouse the opportunity to define the Fourteenth 
14 
Amendment in this broad view was lost. Hall provided a rare opportunity in which the federal 
government could wrap the Fourteenth Amendment completely around the rights of black 
citizens; it could have been a major advancement towards Democracy. 
Unfortunately, the higher courts in later cases did not agree with Justice Bradley and 
Justice Woods. In fact, both justices later reversed their opinions in defining the broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These later courts ruled that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applied to state action only, not to the actions of individuals and thus could not 
directly apply the Bill of Rights to the States. Without a direct link between the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights, and with the state governments’ refusal to protect their black 
citizens, the federal government was powerless to insure the rights of the former slaves. There 
was no provision in the Constitution which guaranteed former slaves any protection from 
individuals. U.S. v. Hall provided a small window of opportunity in which the opinion of the 
court was malleable enough to define the Fourteenth Amendment in a manner which guaranteed 
and protected the rights of citizens from both state and individual action. Instead the court set 
precedents against equal rights in Slaughterhouse that took almost a century to overturn. 
The events discussed are just three of many other violent incidents that occurred in the 
town of Eutaw during Reconstruction. But they demonstrate the possibility of a judicial 
interpretation strong enough to provide protection for the freedmen and protect the Republican 
Party. Reconstruction era Eutaw provides scholars the story of Reconstruction on a smaller scale. 
Though the actions in Eutaw may seem exaggerated compared to all other southern communities, 
these extreme actions are what caused the ultimate failure of Reconstruction. 
The story of Reconstruction on a grand scale has been widely written and thoroughly 
revised by many scholars. Early scholars followed William Archibald Dunning’s Essays on the 
15 
Civil War and Reconstruction.  Published in 1897, this work was a pro-southern, racist view of 
Reconstruction. However, historians used it as a basis for scholarly research for several decades. 
Dunning focused on the Constitutional view of the Civil War and Reconstruction. A student of 
Dunning’s, Walter Lynwood Fleming, published Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama in 
1905. Although it follows the Dunning school of thought, Fleming’s work stands alone. No other 
in-depth study of Reconstruction in the entire State of Alabama has been published since. 
Fleming begins his analysis long before Reconstruction, during the “sectional controversy” of 
the 1850s. Dunning’s work no doubt influenced Fleming’s, as evidenced by Fleming’s 
categorically pro-southern stance. An example: “White men were often members of the board of 
colored schools. All this was before the negro was seen to be hopelessly in the clutches of the 
northerners” and “The people of the north Alabama white counties…were opposed to any form 
of negro suffrage…[t]he Black Belt people who had less prejudice against the negro and who 
were sure that they could control him and gain in political power, were more favorably 
inclined.”16 Although Fleming’s work remains the sole history of Alabama during 
Reconstruction William Warren Rogers, Robert David Ward, Leah Rawls Atkins and Wayne 
Flynt covered the history of Alabama from pre-colonization through the end of the Twentieth 
Century in Alabama: The History of a Deep South State (1994) but devoted only a brief section 
to Reconstruction as a whole. 
It took fifty years for historians to overturn the Dunning school. C. Vann Woodward’s 
Origins of the New South, (1951) Kenneth Stampp’s, The Era of Reconstruction (1965), and 
Allen W. Trelease’s White Terror: The Ku Klux Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction (1971) 
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all helped to revise the image of the evil Carpetbagger and the victimized white southerner.  All 
bring to light the violent actions of Southern Democrats. These works place blacks in the story as 
important participants who cannot be ignored, not as mere character actors victimized by the 
actions of the whites in both the North and the South. These revisionists thus gave blacks 
historical agency. 
In his definitive work on Reconstruction, Eric Foner continued with the revisionist 
findings and devoted part of his 1988 tome Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 
1863-1877 to southern society. Foner takes on race directly, stating, that “Instead of viewing 
racism as a deus ex machine that independently explains the course of events and 
Reconstruction’s demise, I view it as an intrinsic part of the process of historical development, 
which affected and was effected by changes in the social and political order.” 17 Foner’s 
approach directly impacted this study, as it views race as intrinsically linked with the legal 
battles during Reconstruction.  
The town of Eutaw has made appearances in some of the broad works of Reconstruction. 
Eutaw is mentioned in Trelease’s work on the Ku Klux Klan, for example. However, Trelease 
uses the riot as an example of the violence that appeared commonly in the area. He does not 
consider the legal consequences of the Hall case. Foner mentions the Eutaw Riot, but only 
briefly as an example of violence throughout the whole South. But there are lessons to be learned 
from Eutaw about the reaction in the courts and the legislation on the national scale.  
While Eutaw has been the focus of a few scholars’ works, none closely examine the far-
reaching effects of the violent events. The Alabama Review featured William Warren Rogers 
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Jr.’s “The Eutaw Prisoners: Federal Confrontation with Violence in Reconstruction Alabama.” 
(1990) Rogers discusses the trial of the Eutaw prisoners, arguing that this episode was 
significant, because the Third Military District convicted several whites for violence against 
Republicans in a time that many civil juries were afraid to do so because of the Ku Klux Klan’s 
threats.
18
 However, a major question remains unanswered: when such precedents had been set, 
why did Meade reverse the decision and then pardon the prisoners?  
Perhaps the Eutaw Riot has earned the attention of historians, most comprehensively in 
“Political Terrorism in the Black Belt: The Eutaw Riot” (1980) by Melinda Meek Hennessey. 
Hennessey details the riot and touches on its effects on the following election, focusing primarily 
on the eventual success of the Democratic Party.
19
 A short history of Eutaw is given in a speech 
by Mrs. Cecil R. Glass entitled the “Early Days of Eutaw.”(1965) Glass mentions the same 
courthouse that provided the location of the riot and the burning of that courthouse a year earlier. 
Glass provides a brief glimpse into the makeup of the town of Eutaw but does not delve into the 
significance of the town to the legal history of Reconstruction.
20
  
Christopher Waldrep shows in “Joseph P. Bradley’s Journey: The Meaning of Privileges 
and Immunities” (2009) how Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley changed his interpretation 
on the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause. Waldrep analyzes 
correspondence between Bradley and his colleague William Woods, the judge who heard the 
case of United States v. Hall. Though Waldrep mainly focuses on Bradley, he provides insight 
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into how the Supreme Court leaned at the time and how the decisions for later verdicts like the 
Slaughterhouse Cases would eventually come down.
21
 
William Warren Rogers wrote an in depth article on the murder of Alexander Boyd. In 
“The Boyd Incident: Black Belt Violence During Reconstruction,” (1975) Rogers details the 
town of Eutaw and the men involved both directly and indirectly. Rogers discusses William 
Miller, Boyd’s uncle and Charles Hays, a Republican Congressman, two men who were both 
heavily involved in the affairs of the town of Eutaw. The governor eventually learned of the 
murder and sent an investigator. Rogers goes though the later investigation of both that murder 
and previous violence that occurred in Greene County. 
22
 Rogers sufficiently describes the events 
of the murder and the direct consequences afterwards. The town begged the governor for 
protection, which he provided by sending the military to Greene County. Rogers goes no further 
in investigating the outcome.  
Very few historians have looked at the lower-level courts during Reconstruction. Most 
judicial accounts focus on the Supreme Court and the verdicts and precedents handed down. 
However, the lower courts were where many of the legal battles of Reconstruction took place. 
The lower-level circuit courts across the South tried numerous cases of violence involving 
Klansmen. It was the lower- level courts that first attempted to use the Enforcement Acts to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and link it with the Bill of Rights. These courts had many 
successes, and even their failures produced legal precedents that reflected the opportunities of 
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Reconstruction. By focusing on the federal circuit courts, historians can see where 
Reconstruction might have led the United States. 
23
 
Obviously, when analyzing the decisions of the Supreme Court and its appellate courts, 
the Constitution becomes the most relevant resource. Looking at the Fourteenth Amendment, 
with its privileges and immunities clause and how these events fit into the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s broader picture gives historians an idea of the effects of Reconstruction. The 
social impacts are better highlighted when analyzing a smaller section of the country. Focusing 
on Eutaw, Alabama and how the citizens of the town reacted to Reconstruction, the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and the Enforcement Act, gives historians a glimpse into why Reconstruction 
failed, and what could have been changed to prevent its collapse.  
This work will look closely at the federal government’s attempts to bring the Klan to 
justice in a small Alabama Black Belt town. It demonstrates the possibility for an entirely 
different interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments one that would have had a much 
better chance of enforcing black rights for the long haul. 
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Chapter 1 - “Have Mercy and Send Some Protection” 
 Eutaw, Alabama became relevant to the broader story of Reconstruction almost 
immediately after the Civil War. In many ways the Alabama town directly reflected events 
happening on a larger scale in the southern United States. Every new era in Reconstruction, new 
piece of legislation, or argument made by northerners and southerners alike, reflected directly 
back on events taking place in Eutaw. The town of Eutaw saw guilty Klansmen pardoned 
because of public outrage, a state attorney murdered in cold blood with no arrests made, and a 
general fear on the part of Republicans for their rights and their safety. Eutaw was full of the Ku 
Klux Klan, rotten politicians, a deteriorating state legal system, and terrified former slaves. The 
town provides the perfect lens through which to view Reconstruction. Eutaw was the scene of 
many missed opportunities during Reconstruction, judicially, legally, and constitutionally.   
 It is important to understand events that unfolded in and around Eutaw, because the town 
itself was a singular piece in a larger puzzle. Reconstruction began in the halls of Congress, not 
in the small Alabama town. Yet the legislation handed down from Congress, and the reaction of 
southerners to that legislation, became vitally important to the story of Reconstruction as a 
whole. Reconstruction was contingent upon the reaction and cooperation of the citizens of the 
southern states. By focusing on this microcosm, Eutaw gives historians a lens through which to 
view the time period. Eutaw and its citizens were directly affected by events that the region as a 
whole faced.  
 Eutaw’s most important role in Reconstruction, however, is held not within important 
events but in actions that did not occur. The town of Eutaw saw events transpire which gave the 
federal government an opportunity to take the newly formed Reconstruction Amendments, 
specifically the Fourteenth, and grant African Americans the equal rights of citizenship. United 
21 
States v Hall provided the first opportunity in which the federal government could directly link 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Hall case produced an unprecedented 
interpretation of the new amendment, a broad, nationalistic interpretation that would benefit the 
freed slaves, and potentially alter the course of Reconstruction. While U.S. v Hall was the first 
instance in the courts to protect the rights of the former slaves within the framework of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, its overall legacy is one of missed opportunity. After U.S. v Hall 
numerous other circumstances arose for the courts to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
the Eutaw Riot and the subsequent court case remained the prime example of the federal courts’ 
willingness to interpret the new Amendment with a sweeping protection of black rights. When 
reviewing the legal history of Reconstruction, Unites States v Hall furnishes the pivotal moment 
in which to examine what might have been.  
 On April 9, 1865 the Civil War effectively ended when General Robert E. Lee 
surrendered to General Ulysses S. Grant. No American at its onset dared to imagine a more 
gruesome, hard-fought, and bloody war. When southerners finally laid down their weapons after 
four years of grisly battle, the motivations of both North and South became clear. The sections 
were driven to battle by apparently different causes in truth both northerners and southerners 
fought because of slavery. With the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 the North shifted focus 
from maintaining the Union to abolishing slavery. The South fought for the doctrine of states’ 
rightsprincipally the right to hold slaves as property.  
After four years of conflict, southerners lost the war and their slaves, but their attitudes 
toward the freed slaves remained. Long before the war the South was built on a foundation of 
honor. Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s Honor and Violence in the Old South explains that “[f]rom the 
start, slavery and honor were mutually dependent. After emancipation in 1865, honor, like the 
22 
labor system that had nourished it, lived on in truncated yet vigorous form, especially with 
regard to laws and practices that perpetuated the humiliation and subjugation of black people…”1 
 The War freed the blacks but it left in its wake a crippled society. The war destroyed the 
South’s social and economic foundation and white southerners possessed no desire to build a 
new one. Because the South held slavery at its core, the United States after the Civil War had to 
rebuild the southern states from the ground up, not an easy task with so many unwilling 
participants. The end of the war brought about the onset of this period of Reconstruction. 
Reconstruction consisted of several stages all fraught with tension and violence. The period 
made long strides within the Constitution especially in the areas of constitutional doctrine for the 
advancement of freedmen and women throughout the country, only to have these advancements 
diminish and fail miserably in the end.  
 Lincoln’s plan for reconstructing the South ended with his assassination. Before the end 
of the War, Lincoln and his advisors formed a plan for re-admitting the southern states. Lincoln’s 
“Ten Percent Plan” was lenient and probably unworkable, but he had the support of some of the 
Radical Republicans in Congress. Assassination angered many Republicans who were not as 
supportive of Lincoln’s vice president and his successor, Andrew Johnson.  Johnson’s more 
moderate views on presidential pardons and state government infuriated the more Radical 
Republicans in Congress at the time.  The governors in the southern states appointed by Johnson 
faced difficulty in staffing their states’ offices. The Ironclad Oath, which stated that an individual 
had never aided the Confederate government, kept many southerners from being able to take 
office or sit on juries. It proved difficult to find many white southerners who in some way or 
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another had not helped the Confederacy. Many southern governors were forced to ignore or 
purposely disregard this rule and appoint leaders who would support their policies. 
2
 
 With the southern governments back in the hands of secessionists, labor became the next 
hurdle to overcome. Many former Confederates questioned the new labor force. “Black Codes” 
became prevalent throughout many southern states. As historian Eric Foner writes, Black Codes 
attempted “to stabilize the black work force and limit its economic options apart from plantation 
labor.”3 Many blacks signed labor contracts and if they violated the contract they would forfeit 
their wages. Any citizen of the state could arrest a black laborer, and vagrancy could be defined 
as misspending of their own wages.
4
 The abolition of slavery in no way created equal rights for 
blacks since these Black Codes gave southern whites the opportunity to recreate as closely as 
possible the conditions of slavery.  
 The Congressional elections of 1866 brought to power many Radical Republicans, 
including men like Thadeus Stevens and Charles Sumner, who had always spoken out against 
slavery. These Radicals believed Johnson’s policies too lenient toward the South. In an attempt 
to chasten the southern states, Congress in the 1867 Military Reconstruction Act divided the 
South into five military districts, claiming that southern states “are not ready for reconstruction 
as independent states on any terms or conditions which Congress might impose.”5 The 
acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment became a condition for readmission to the Union; this 
was the very same amendment southern states had previously rebuked.  
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  With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment in January 1865 many ardent abolitionists 
and moderate Republicans in the North believed the battle for abolition complete. Yet some, 
including the black leader Frederick Douglas, believed that abolition could only be successful 
with the establishment of black suffrage.
6
 The South demonstrated that merely ending the 
enslavement of blacks did nothing to provide them equal rights. Congress used the following 
Fourteenth Amendment not only as a filter for the newly formed state governments but also, and 
more importantly, to declare freed blacks citizens of the United States. This declaration 
effectively overturned Dred Scott (1857), in which the Supreme Court stripped African 
Americans of any right to citizenship. The Fourteenth Amendment made clear that U.S. 
citizenship was paramount to state citizenship.  
The few words of the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States…”7 were among the most debated within the Constitution until 
Slaughterhouse (1873) later emasculated the clause.
8
 The framers’ choice to word the clause 
negatively and focus on the states rather than individuals gave southerners leeway in finding 
ways around the new amendment.  This development led Congress to pass a third and final 
Reconstruction Amendment the Fifteenth which the states ratified on February 3, 1870. The 
Fifteenth Amendment, like the Fourteenth, is written in the negative, requiring that neither the 
United States nor any state within could deny a citizen the right to vote “on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude.” Southerners again found ways around the amendment 
                                                 
6
 Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction: 1863-1877. (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 31. 
7
 U.S. Constitution, 14
th
 Amendment, sec. 4. 
8
 Live-Stock Dealers’ & Butchers’ Ass’n v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co. et al., 15 
F. Cas. 649 (C.C.D. La., 1870). 
25 
when the courts ruled that individuals acting without state sponsorship could not be held 
responsible for infringing on black suffrage.
9
 
 When the amendments failed to protect blacks in the South, the Congress turned toward 
enforcing these amendments with appropriate legislation.  The Enforcement Acts gave Congress 
the power to prosecute individuals despite the state action provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. With the Enforcement Acts came a means of repressing the wave of violence 
perpetuated across the South by the Ku Klux Klan. This group of radical southerners quickly 
spread across the South, threatening and often following through on violence against both black 
and white Republicans. The key section in the First Enforcement Act of 1870 allowed the U.S. to 
prosecute whenever “two or more persons shall band or conspire together, or go in disguise upon 
the public highway, or upon the premises of another, with intent to violate any provision of this 
act, or to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen with intent to prevent or hinder his 
free exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.”10 Finally, Congress had given the United States 
government the power to protect the rights of citizens against individual action.
11
 
 With the Third Enforcement Act in 1871— more popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan 
Act— Congress assumed the power to send in federal troops to stop the violence of the Klan and 
to prevent anyone connected with the Klan from serving on juries. This newly established power 
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led to a wave of prosecutions under the Enforcement Act; the South Carolina Klan trials of 1871 
and 1872 were the most ambitious and unprecedented. President Grant used his legal power to 
suspend Habeas Corpus in nine South Carolina counties and, as a result, the federal government 
arrested hundreds of Klansmen.
12
  
While the national government attempted to create legislation to enforce the rights of 
black citizens, some people in the South took action themselves. Frederick Douglass once said, 
“What shall we do with the Negro? Do nothing… give him a chance to stand on his own legs! 
Let him alone!”13 With that same spirit in mind, Union or Loyal Leagues developed throughout 
the South. Initially formed to help the cause of the Union during the Civil War, these Loyal 
Leagues morphed into organizations dedicated to help the freed blacks stand alone. Unwilling to 
accept the civil rights of the newly freed slaves, whites typically abhorred the Leagues. However, 
Greene County, Alabama, was different. One of the wealthiest counties in the state when the war 
broke out, Greene County owed most of its prosperity to slavery. As of 1870, 7,251 whites 
resided in the county, but blacks outnumbered whites three to one with a total population of 
23,598.
14
  Not surprisingly, planters hoped to control both the politics and the employment 
opportunities of their former slaves.  
What makes Greene County particularly interesting was how the white residents dealt 
with Reconstruction and the enfranchisement of the blacks. Instead of fighting the Leagues, 
many landowners by the summer of 1867 had actually joined the Leagues, hoping thereby to 
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control the blacks from within.
15
 When blacks were not so easily controlled, the majority of 
whites initiated a new plan; political threat and social ostracism forced many white Republicans 
out of both the Loyal League and the Republican Party.
16
 Whites also exerted pressure on the 
freedmen “to leave the League, rather than trying to neutralize its political impact from the 
inside,” according to historian Michael Fitzgerald.17 By 1870 fewer than twelve white 
Republicans were left in Greene County.
18
 The few white Republicans who remained in the 
Union League successfully used Republican politics both “to secure a more contented work 
force” and to maintain themselves in office.19 Indeed Fitzgerald observed that “planter-scalawags 
certainly received a proportion of offices far beyond their minuscule percentage of the republican 
electorate.”20   
Two of the richest men in the county led the Greene County, Alabama League  one of 
those men being Republican Congressman Charles Hays. A former secessionist, Hays served in 
the Confederate Army during the war. In 1870 Hays owned only half of the land he owned in 
1860, yet he still ranked among the top thirteen
 
landowners in the state.
21
 Hays joined the 
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Republican Party in 1867 and then promptly ran for Congress.
22
  Hays held Republican meetings 
at his plantation, Hays Mount, which added to Democrats’ dislike of him.23 Congressman Hays 
also garnered support from his Republican followers, black and white, by paying the high bonds, 
which were fees public officials had to pay before running for office. Hays then used the favor to 
leverage votes.
24
  
Considering Alabama as a whole, citizens became Republicans for obvious reasons, 
according to historian William Cash: twenty-six percent of Republicans consisted of former 
slaves, former Union Whigs composed twenty-two percent, and northerners made up thirty 
percent.
25
 This leaves twenty-two percent for opportunistic planters who saw the benefit of 
joining the Republican Party and using their means to work themselves into important political 
offices. Close to half of the state legislators in 1868, whose military background could be traced, 
were former Confederate soldiers. Often, former Confederates ran for office as Republicans in 
Greene County, and in 1870 “a Republican newspaper proudly boasted… of a one legged 
Confederate soldier…as [a] legislative [nominee].” 26 These white Republicans, though few in 
number, organized the former slaves expertly. For the time being, Republicans therefore 
controlled the Greene County government.
27
 
 Those white Republicans who had joined the League to help the freedmen fell lax on 
their job. William Miller, the Republican judge for Greene County, saw so many contracts as 
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damaging to blacks that he simply refused to adhere to them.
28
 With only a few powerful white 
Republicans left, the political parties divided primarily according to color.  
In the 1868 election the election that ratified the new Alabama constitution as required 
by Congress Republicans were “generally deterred” from voting.29 The black majority of 
Republicans faced insurmountable intimidation at the polls. In Eutaw, the county seat of Greene 
County, “rowdies tore the constitutional option off some ballots during the election and forced 
some polls to close temporarily.”30 The new state constitution created another source of tension 
between the Republicans and Democrats. It reminded the former Confederates of their defeat and 
symbolized the new society, which they feared. They did everything in their power to fight a 
state constitution that banned slavery. The Mobile Daily Register declared, “Now, it is the well 
settled determination of the planters not to work their lands beyond the mere production of food 
for their own families if the Constitution is ratified.”31 When a local Alabama paper printed the 
Constitution of the United States without the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Democratic newspaper did not mince words: “That document is the Constitution of the United 
States—we mean the Constitution as it appears upon the national records, in its unmutilated 
form, and before the Radical Iconoclast had so deformed it that were its patriotic authors to rise 
from their graves, they would not recognize it as the work of their hands.”32  
Democrats greatly feared a lack of control over the black vote. With the 1868 election 
and Republican Governor Smith’s support, the Alabama legislature passed legislation outlawing 
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the use of voter registration lists. Both Democrats and Republicans feared that voter registration 
would cause fraud at the polls.  Walter L. Fleming, Alabama’s Dunning era historian believed 
the lists—which were not comprehensive—were created to keep former Confederate whites from 
the polls.
33
 After registration lists could no longer be required for black voters, the fear became 
that “after this a negro might vote under any name he pleased as often as he pleased.”34 As The 
Mobile Daily Register, a notoriously Democratic newspaper in Alabama wrote of the 1868 
election, 
We learn that numbers of negroes were imported here, and rushed around from one place 
to another, and made to vote again and again. Under the present infamous and farcical 
election laws it was not possible to challenge their votes or protect the purity of the ballot 
box from these bare faced frauds: and as for trying to identify any negro as having voted 
before, it was next to impossible, for negro faces are as much alike as so many cocoanuts 
[sic], and it is out of the question to try and distinguish any one of them, particularly 
under the circumstances.
35
  
 
Despite Democratic fears—and Dunning interpretations--the reality was that white 
Democrats practiced voter fraud far more often than their black Republican counterparts. And 
even if Democrats laid the charges of fraud at the feet of white Republicans, Democrats watched 
and patrolled the polls with such vigor that many blacks could not cast a vote successfully one 
time let alone multiple times.36  
Any vote other than one for the Democratic ticket might provoke violence and 
intimidation, and Democrats did not just target blacks. The white people of Greene County and 
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Eutaw also lived in fear; as one resident reported, “My honest opinion is this: generally in 
Greene County, if every man had his own way they would generally vote the [R]epublican ticket. 
I have no doubt of that fact.”37 Civilians and government officials alike faced the threat of 
violence by these Democrats and “one result of…pressure or of ostracism was a large number of 
resignations by officeholders.”38 
This pressure came from Democrats throughout the South as well as Greene County. 
Masked riders rode often in Greene County. Local newspaper reports seem to indicate that the 
Ku Klux Klan officially formed in Greene County after the February 1868 election.
39
 However, 
witnesses spotted Klansmen in Greene County not long before President Grant’s election in 
November 1868. Therefore the election itself holds no responsibility for the Klan’s initial 
progression across the State of Alabama, although the election may have been a catalyst for its 
growth afterwards.
40
 Alabama seems to have been the first state outside of Tennessee in which 
the Klan spread widely.  After the first few years, the Klan settled into key areas within the state, 
the Black Belt being one.  
John Hunnicutt and J.J. Jolly are two of the whites who worked together to establish the 
Klan in Greene County and neighboring Hale county. Writing in his memoirs years later, 
Hunnicutt recalled, “we had a few men who had nerve enough to come out bold and open and 
fight these fellows (Rep) and show their crookedness.”41 Jolly was a prominent Democratic 
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lawyer from Eutaw.
42
 Records show that only one Jolly lived in the area at the time, so there is 
no doubt about the lawyer’s connection with the Klan in Greene and neighboring counties.43 
Hunnicutt very likely burned down the Greene County courthouse in Eutaw on March 20, 1868, 
at the instruction of Jolly.
44
 Members commonly burned courthouses to protect Klansmen from 
any evidence that might be stored within these government buildings. Jolly, being a lawyer for 
many Democrats, would have had access to information regarding prosecutions. 
Jolly and Hunnicutt represented the key demographic of Klansmen. In fact, according to 
historian Michael Fitzgerald, “in terms of social composition, the terrorist movement seems 
broadly based among native rural whites, both in numbers and class background.”45 Many 
Klansmen initially hoped to make a difference politically and the organization paralleled the 
Democratic Party. Eventually, this parallel “ceased to exist in ferocity. It became simple racial 
mayhem, with a more tenuous connection to electoral considerations.”46 The Klan in Black Belt 
Alabama and especially Greene County began to act as individual units with very little 
synchronicity across the state.
47
  
The Klan worked to uphold southern honor as well as the political and racial status quo.  
Men who wanted to enact vengeance or defend themselves from an insult might have the 
backing of these vigilante riders. Any insult on one’s character or the appearance of exerting 
power whether political or physical over a man could result in his honor being insulted. Insults 
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could not be tolerated, because “a man was what public opinion held him to be. Fear of being 
shamed, more than conscience or guilt, dictated Southerners’ behavior.”48 
Whatever their motives, Alabama Klansmen rarely faced the consequences of their 
actions.  Few cases went to trial and even fewer convicted Klansmen for any act of violence or 
intimidation during Reconstruction.
49
 Witnesses found it difficult to testify against an 
organization that many people claimed did not even exist. Congress formed a Joint Committee to 
look into the affairs of the southern states. The committee conducted the most in depth 
investigation into the South up to that period and published their findings in 1872. They 
interviewed hundreds of southern citizens and produced thirteen volumes (over 7,000 pages) of 
testimony in minute print.  Three volumes (over 2,000 pages) were dedicated specifically to 
events in Alabama. Within these pages witnesses, both Republican and Democrat, white and 
black, Klansmen and victims, describe the events in the South after the end of the war providing 
the most extensive collection of firsthand accounts recorded during Reconstruction.  When this 
Congressional Committee questioned Jolly, he not only denied the presence of the Ku Klux Klan 
in Greene County but denied its existence anywhere in the country: “I will state that, so far as my 
information goes, and it is pretty general throughout that section of the country, I do not believe 
that the Ku-Klux organization, or anything that assimilates to the character given to that 
organization, has ever existed in that section of country, or does now exist there.”50 Klan leaders 
across the state joined Jolly in denying the existence of the organization. Newspapers run by 
known Klansmen tried to “explain the [K]lan away,” because they believed that acknowledging 
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its existence would mar the already imperfect image that the rest of the country had of the 
South.
51
 Nevertheless, the KKK Reports stand today as solemn witness to the condition of the 
South during Reconstruction. 
Despite the Klan’s denial of its existence many Republicans saw the pattern of lies that 
emerged as William Miller, for one, complained to the Congressional Committee that the 
“assaults and murders…[arose] out of political cause.”52 When asked if he thought “it was the 
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment, together with the [R]econstruction [A]cts of Congress, what is 
generally embraced in the term reconstruction policy of Congress, [that] gave dissatisfaction,” 
the former Governor of Alabama, Robert Lindsay, replied that “It gave great dissatisfaction.”53 
John Minnis, the United States attorney for Alabama, believed that the Klan’s acts arose from the 
same mindset that brought about secession.
54
 Another Alabamian thought that politics had 
become so violent, because of the “long continued indulgence of passions, accompanied by a 
conviction that the Southern people are the most grossly wronged and outraged people on the 
face of the earth.”55  
Opinions of the Klan often divided along party lines. The Klan represented an unofficial 
Democratic body, the “terrorist arm of the Democratic Party”, as historian Allen Trelease labeled 
it.
56
 Democrats in Greene County believed it was their responsibility to keep blacks and 
Republicans in their “proper” places. They believed the federal government was too strong and 
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the Alabama government was unfairly forced to accept these radical terms regarding blacks. One 
white Republican received a letter from the Klan after an election, which read, “We send you a 
copy of the Bible and a strong rope! Ask your friends (if you have any) to assist you. Should you 
return… we will try and have [you] viewed from the standpoint you deserve.”57 Many 
Republicans obviously feared the Klan and the repercussions of voting the Republican ticket. In 
regard to punishment of members of the Klan, another Eutaw citizen said, “Whenever you shall 
convince them that there is a power which can take cognizance of their crimes and punish them, 
you will put a stop to them. And you will find a very large body of people at once ready to rally 
to your support.”58  
From the very beginning of Reconstruction, Eutaw faced challenges with both Democrats 
and the Ku Klux Klan. In 1868 Republican William Miller was elected the new Judge of Probate, 
but because Democrats considered the new laws and state constitution null and void, the former 
Judge, Democrat William Oliver, refused to give up his seat and Miller asked the Governor of 
Alabama for assistance.
59
 Judge Oliver approached J.J. Jolly and William Morgan, two 
prominent lawyers in Eutaw, for their assistance in keeping his position. According to Judge 
Miller, these two lawyers believed that they had a case for keeping Judge Oliver in office, but 
they later denied any legal basis for these opinions.
60
  Democrats consulted Jolly again in 1870, 
when the incoming Democratic governor, Robert Lindsay, attempted to take office and his 
Republican counterpart William Smith, refused to leave.
61
 Democrats across the county 
attempted everything within their power to gain control of the state government. The people of 
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Eutaw considered Jolly a prominent Democratic lawyer, but he was also a member of the Klan 
who could work outside the law. The efforts of the Democrats prevailed when their Republican 
counterparts left office; the unofficial efforts by the Klan demonstrated the widespread use of 
this southern logic. 
Miller, now the Probate Judge in Eutaw, Alabama, faced so much opposition from 
Democrats and Klansmen that he wanted to resign. In fact, after one assault on the streets of 
Eutaw, he defaulted on a case because he feared for his life.
62
 Guilford Coleman, a black man 
from Eutaw, was a delegate to the state convention which nominated Charles Hays and Governor 
Smith. Days after Coleman returned from the convention, masked riders abducted him from his 
house and he was never seen again.
63
 Arthur Smith, a white clerk in the town of Eutaw, went to 
Demopolis to testify against a bailiff for the town. When he returned the bailiff told Smith he 
would shoot him on sight the next time they ran into each other. At their next meeting, however, 
the man claimed he had no recollection and believed himself drunk when he made the threat. 
Smith eventually did resign his position as clerk, becoming tired of the threats and violence 
within the town of Eutaw.
64
 The prominent Democrats in town told a different story of Smith’s 
resignation. According to Jolly, no Democrat made any threats; Smith had simply offended the 
citizens of Eutaw and then resigned.
65
  
Democrats and Republicans almost invariably had a different story for the same event. 
Democrats rarely saw threats or could name any occurrence in which violence against 
Republicans or blacks took place. When Democrats acknowledged that an act of violence 
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occurred, they generally blamed the victims. According to Democrats, Republicans usually 
deserved what they received; they had no honor and therefore did not deserve the same rights as 
honorable white men.
66
  
 The Ku Klux Klan basically rode unimpeded throughout Greene County from 1868 until 
the implementation of the Third Enforcement Act of 1871. However, “Military action and the 
imposition of martial law were probably the most effective means of bringing Klansmen to 
account.”67  During the military era of Reconstruction, “The primary duties of these officers were 
‘to protect all persons in their rights of person and property, to suppress insurrection, disorder 
and violence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and 
criminals.’”68 The Klan theoretically could not pressure a jury or threaten witnesses during 
military rule. In practice, the Klan faced little opposition even by the military, not because the 
military turned a blind eye, but because the government could not stop the subterfuge of the 
Klan. Neighbors still feared for their safety if they testified against the Klan or Democrats known 
to have Klan ties. The military’s task of convincing people that they were safe to testify proved 
difficult.  
 In Eutaw, the military had the opportunity to bring Klansmen to justice and set an 
example for all the townspeople. In the assault of white Methodist minister, Joseph Benjamin 
Fitzpatrich Hill, it failed dramatically. Hill had moved from South Carolina to Eutaw before the 
war and promptly joined the Confederate army as a chaplain. After the war, Hill joined the 
Republican Party, created a school for freedmen, and joined the local Union League. Clearly he 
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had a change of heart regarding the freed people.  A resident of the nearby town of Union, Hill 
visited a store in Eutaw on Saturday, March 14, 1868.
69
 
 On that day a group of men followed Hill into Alfred Almont’s store. One of the men, 
William Pettigrew Jr., confronted Hill about a debt that he owed to Pettigrew’s father. After Hill 
claimed that he knew nothing of the debt, Pettigrew struck Hill, and the men managed to push 
him out into the street. Several men assisted Pettigrew in beating Hill while others looked on. At 
one point Hill managed to escape and run down the street, but the small mob followed. Before 
the crowd could reach Hill, James Clark, the town chancellor, managed to calm them and let Hill 
escape. Later a member of the mob, James Steele, visited Hill’s home. After Steele left, five 
more of the group visited Hill and warned him he had three days to leave town. The group 
“denounced his ‘d---d Radicalism’ and informed Hill that ‘no niggers should ever be educated to 
vote again in Greene County.”70 Hill promptly left the county.  
 Hill reported the incident to Freedmen’s Bureau agents, who issued warrants and arrested 
fifteen men in total for the assaults. The arrests caused quite the outrage in the town of Eutaw, 
because most of the men were respectable citizens of the county: a stagecoach driver, a member 
of an established Greene County family, a farmer/school teacher, and a shoemaker among 
them.
71
 Shocked citizens could not believe these young men were being held by federal 
authorities, and they became even more shocked when General George Meade, the head of the 
Fifth Military District, put the matter in the hands of the military. 
 Under the Military Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, the military effectively took 
control of the court system. Until Alabama ratified a new constitution, General Meade had the 
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choice whether to let a case go to the circuit court or hold a military tribunal. Alabama would be 
readmitted to the Union just four months after the Eutaw Prisoner case, but until that time the 
military held jurisdiction over the proceedings.
72
 
 The prisoners were charged with riot, assault, battery and lynching. According to the 
Alabama Code, lynching was “an attack by two or more persons on another for various purposes 
stated in the statute. One of these reasons involved any attempt to force an individual from an 
area.”73 At the trial, John Pierce and J.J. Jolly defended the prisoners. The defense claimed that 
the case was not under military jurisdiction, however, “convinced that the Hill incident was 
politically motivated, Meade looked to the army for quick and sure justice. If the men were 
guilty, their conviction would deter others from political crimes.”74 This trial gave the military 
and the federal government an opportunity to hold the citizens of Alabama responsible for their 
actions. The military could make an example out of these young men and show Alabamians that 
violence against blacks or Republicans would not be tolerated no matter what the apparent 
reason. The military could make a just and unbiased decision with the facts presented, so Klan 
members had no chance of persuading or intimidating the jury.  
 During the trial, the prosecution brought several witnesses forward. One witness in 
particular, Soule Hill, the son of Joseph Hill, swore one of the prisoners “said that father got his 
abuse on account of his political opinions.”75 The owner of the store, Allmont, as well as James 
B. Clarke, and a freedman named Ephriam Webb, all testified against the prisoners. After the 
tribunal took place officers sent transcripts, results, and recommendations to Meade. Several of 
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the accused were sentenced to hard labor in Florida’s Dry Tortugas at Fort Jefferson. They began 
their journey on May 4. While the press espoused the credibility and the characters of the 
convicted men, the public became outraged at the severity of the punishment. Several politicians, 
including former Senator Robert Jemison and Congressman Hays, asked for the release of the 
prisoners. Hays’ mercy seems unusual, because he, as a Republican Congressman, was asking 
for leniency for Democrats who attacked Republicans.  Hays justified his views by stating that 
the punishment of the prisoners upset Greene County and more violence would result.
76
 Former 
Senator Francis S. Lyon, a Democrat, called Meade fair and the best leader of any military 
district in the South, but he thought Meade oppressed all of Alabama by finding the prisoners 
guilty.
77
 
 On May 17, only thirteen days after the prisoners left, Meade announced that he would 
pardon the prisoners.  On June 11, Fort Jefferson released the prisoners and they made their way 
back to Alabama.
78
 In General Orders: Number Eighty, Meade wrote, “Their conviction and 
punishment having, however, vindicated the principle involved, suffering imposed on the 
relatives and friends of the prisoners of the promises made of future good conduct, and in the 
belief that a proper example, earlier made might have deterred the prisoners from committing the 
offence, has directed the discharge of the prisoners.”79 Meade went on to warn all citizens of the 
South that “The commanding general takes this occasion to state that similar clemency need not 
be expected in future, and he warns the people of his District that he is determined to suppress all 
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lawlessness and violence, and all attempts of individuals to take the law into their own hands, or 
to decide who shall or shall not live in the country.”80 
 By releasing the prisoners Meade missed a tremendous opportunity. No one in Greene 
County faced punishment for the crimes against blacks or Republicans. This trial created an 
opportunity to show Alabamians the consequences of ignoring the federal laws. Releasing the 
men demonstrated that public opinion could change leaders’ minds. The reversal of this decision 
helped to empower Democrats and remove what little power Republicans had. Blacks and white 
Republicans were worse off than before the trial. The prisoners went back to Greene County 
vindicated for their actions. These prisoners, who were in all probability associated with the 
Klan, could continue their patrol of violence without consequences, because the military was 
weak and the state court system was even weaker.  
 The violence and drama in the town of Eutaw continued throughout Reconstruction. 
After Military Reconstruction ended and Alabama voted to ratify the Constitution, prosecution of 
criminal activity returned to the county and state courts. Democrats and Klan members held so 
much power over the fearful population that state courts were almost powerless. In fact, even 
when a government official became the victim of a crime little could be done. If blacks were to 
receive protection, it would have to be in the federal courts of the United States. 
 The murder of Alexander Boyd, the state solicitor—or prosecutor—for Green County 
demonstrates both the power of the Ku Klux Klan and the powerlessness of the state courts to 
bring Klan members to justice.
81
 Boyd was detested by whites for his Republican Party 
affiliation and his choice of roommates: his uncle William Miller who was the county judge, and 
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a third roommate, who was an agent of the Freedmen’s Bureau. These Republican officials faced 
many threats during their tenure in Eutaw. For example, a man threatened to kill both Miller and 
Boyd when he encountered them on the street. Fortunately a more cautious man prevented the 
assault.
82
 Violence and threats, however, rarely frightened Boyd and he was determined to do his 
job and to oversee justice in Greene County. 
 The situation became more dangerous for Republicans when a white Democrat named 
Sam Snoddy was murdered in Greene County on December 8, 1869.  The murder itself was not 
political; Snoddy was attacked and allegedly killed for his money.  Three suspects emerged all of 
whom were black: Sam Caldwell who was seen having tea with Snoddy shortly before the 
murder, Caldwell’s father Sam Colvin, and Henry Miller, who reported seeing Caldwell washing 
blood out of his clothing.
83
  John Pierce and J.J. Jollythe Klansmen who had defended the 
Eutaw Prisoners three years earlierdefended the three alleged murderers.84 In all probability the 
two lawyers provided very little defense. Lawyers with known Klan ties were likely to be more 
loyal to the Klan than to the law.    
After the men were arrested and jailed matters become vaguer. All three men 
“disappeared,” but testimony varies according to the source.  It is unclear whether they escaped, 
were broken out of jail by the Klan, or released by the jailer to the tender mercies of the Klan.  
Whatever the circumstances, they were safer in jail than out.
85
 Within hours of their release, Sam 
Caldwell disappeared, Henry Miller was found dead, and Sam Colvin was discovered hanging 
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from a tree with sixteen bullet holes in him.
86
 Witnesses testified to the Congressional 
Committee that disguised men attacked Colvin, but it was clear that county officials could not or 
would not solve the crimes.
87
  
At this point, state solicitor Alexander Boyd entered the picture.  Boyd courageously 
asked questions and investigated the crimes in an area where it was dangerous just to be 
affiliated with the Republican Party. Eventually Boyd was satisfied that he knew who killed 
Colvin.  Unfortunately he bragged publicly that he had enough evidence for a conviction, a 
statement that probably cost him his life.
88
  
 On March 31, 1870, the Klan rode into Eutaw to take care of Boyd.  According to 
witnesses, about thirty masked riders, armed with guns, ropes, and even military swords, clad in 
long black gowns—their horses similarly attired—approached the town from two different 
directions.  The two groups converged in the town square, and immediately set out sentinels.
89
 
While part of the men stood guard, the rest barged into the hotel where Boyd was staying.  They 
forced the clerk upstairs to reveal Boyd’s whereabouts. A loud argument ensued and then a fight 
that ended with gunshots. A few minutes later the disguised men came down the stairs, got on 
their horses, and the whole group rode out of town.
90
 It appeared to witnesses that the masked 
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riders had intended to hang Boyd, but he fought too vigorously and as a result his murderers shot 
him on the spot.
91
 
 Unfortunately the local sheriff lacked the determination that Boyd had demonstrated in 
investigating the previous Klan victims.  Informed of the murder immediately, Sheriff Cole 
called for a doctor who performed an autopsy that very night.
92
 Dr. John S. Meriwether found 
three shots to the head and four in Boyd’s abdomen. Five men signed the death certificate, plus 
the doctor, and the sheriff who were present, yet no posse formed to search for the parties 
involved. Witnesses saw the riders head toward Springfield, then return to Eutaw’s town square, 
and then head back toward Springfield.
93
 Yet, authorities made no attempt to arrest or detain 
anyone. The sheriff claimed that he did not have enough men to safely pursue the attackers.
94
 
 The night riders, on the other hand, made the most of their blood-filled night
 
. About 
fifteen miles north of Eutaw, masked riders killed James Martin, a black man who was a Union 
League leader, but had no involvement with the Boyd investigation.  Martin’s roommate ran 
from the riders, but later told authorities that the men shot Martin as he fled the house.
95
 
Conveniently enough, known Klansmen were absent on the night of Boyd’s murder, having 
taken the precaution of establishing an alibi.  J.J. Jolly was out of town during both Boyd’s 
murder and the murder of Sam Colvin.
96
  When news got out that Boyd was buried the next day, 
April 1, 1870, numerous townspeople thought the murder was an April Fool’s joke rather than a 
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real crime.
97
  When they realized there was no fooling involved, fear and shock rippled through 
the town as people wondered what blacks would do in retaliation for Boyd’s murder.  
 The following week blacks did indeed march on the town of Eutaw, where they intended 
to take revenge for their defender’s murder. They burned a store, but well-meaning citizens 
persuaded them to leave town before doing any more damage. Days after the riders killed Boyd, 
his clerk, Arthur Smith, received a letter from the Klan ordering him to leave Eutaw.
98
 When 
William Miller, Boyd’s uncle and former roommate, attempted to collect his nephew’s 
belongings from Eutaw, some Democratic friends advised him to stay away. Eutaw was not safe 
for any of Boyd’s family or friends.99 The Klan had maintained some level of control in Eutaw 
throughout Reconstruction, but Alexander Boyd was the first government official to fall victim 
to the Klan. Now all government agents were terrified that neither their official position nor the 
governments they represented could protect them from the Klan. 
 Democrats throughout town blamed Boyd for his own murder. Fifteen years earlier, Boyd 
and a man named Charner Brown got into a fight, and Boyd killed Brown. Convicted for second 
degree murder, Boyd had served only a year of his ten year sentence when the governor asked 
for clemency, and the court reduced his sentence.
100
 Many townspeople believed that Boyd died 
in retaliation for Brown’s death. Because fifteen years had passed, it seems more likely that 
Boyd died for his political principles and indiscretion in discussing the current murder 
investigation.  Democrats described Boyd as “overbearing… an incompetent officer; and … a 
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very offensive man in every way.”101  Clearly his politics offended white Democrats.  
Republicans and friends of Boyd retaliated, “he was a man of good character, of fair ability; a 
reputable man in every way.” He “was very vigilant and earnest in his work.”102 Regardless of 
their political associations, both groups agreed that Boyd had made powerful enemies, both in his 
killing of Brown years earlier and particularly by announcing his plans to convict Sam Colvin’s 
murderers.  
Refusing to admit any knowledge of the Klan, J.J. Jolly—a known Klan leader– told 
authorities that he believed the group of men got together with no other intention than to kill 
Boyd
103
 For a random group of men put together for one occasion, the nightriders maintained 
extraordinary discipline.  They rode into town in two by two formation, with sentinels, apparent 
“officers,” and guards. Many former Confederate soldiers joined the Klan, which resulted in the 
Klan having the tactical and organizational character of an army. The Klan had a ranking order; 
they had officers who they turned to for orders. They knew their mission, and they did their duty. 
Like the army, the Klan held loyalty in the highest regard.  It is not surprising in the least that 
Jolly, a known Klansman, would not admit the organization’s existence.  
 The governor sent an investigator to investigate the blatant murder of state official, 
Alexander Boyd. John Minnis, who later became a federal district attorney for Alabama, spent 
three weeks in Eutaw.
104
 The grand jury convened for two weeks before ultimately dismissing 
the case.
105
 Investigators could not identify any of the riders. By tracing the tracks from the night 
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of the murder, the jury decided the killers came from outside the county.
106
 The murderers “were 
traced to the Mississippi border line,” and some riders were traced to neighboring Pickens 
County.
107
 Because of a lack of identification, the grand jury claimed it had no choice but to 
dismiss the case. Arthur Smith, brother of Judge Luther Smith who presided over the grand jury, 
claimed, however, that the jury did not do its due diligence. Arthur Smith testified in front of the 
jury under the assumption that his testimony would remain private. Days later, Smith’s testimony 
was known all over the county.
108
 By law grand jury members were required to keep testimony 
and facts of court cases private. Jury members in Eutaw either deliberately neglected this duty, or 
members of the county intimidated the jury into revealing details of the case. It is easy to see 
why so many people feared testifying in courts. Testimonies were well known, and revenge 
could easily be enacted by the Klan. Moreover, grand jurors themselves were frequently 
associated with the Klan. 
 Simply being associated with the Republican Party made many officials marked men. 
Samuel Browne, the Republican Tax Assessor for Greene County, was a former Confederate 
veteran with one leg.  Yet Browne faced threats and assaults multiple times in Eutaw. Believing 
himself a target of the Klan, in addition to Boyd, on the night of the murder, Browne considered 
himself lucky to have left town at the time.
109
 Historian William Warren Rogers writes, “Citing 
outrages against blacks and intimidation of county officials, Browne denounced crime in Greene 
and the utter inability of its officers to suppress it… ‘[p]rotection from the Ku Klux Klan could 
not be relied on from the court system because Our Grand Juries indict us & protect them from 
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indictment.’”110 Eutaw’s Republican citizens, both black and white, earnestly wanted to find 
Boyd’s killers, but they feared the Klan.111 One citizen wrote to the governor pleading for help, 
“In the name of God, have mercy and send some protection. I will suggest, that our county be put 
under Marshall [sic] law. Do away with these little civil officers, who are afraid, not brave 
enough to do their duty. As for our sheriff we might as well be without one.”112 
 As a result of the pleading from residents and the assassination of State Prosecutor Boyd, 
Governor Smith sent troops to Eutaw on April 7, a little over a week after the murder. Ten troops 
arrived on April 12. Republicans feared that ten men would not be enough to hold the violence of 
the Klan at bay. On the other hand Democrats thought the small number of soldiers unnecessary 
because in their eyes they were generally following the laws and only minimal violence 
occurred.
113
 
 According to Alabama State Judge Luther Smith, the Boyd case was the first incident that 
actually obstructed the state court system in Greene County.
114
 And yet, “Almost no one of the 
Klan was ever punished by Southern courts, even under Republican state governments.”115 The 
Klan acted as they wished. Their motivation was “driven by the fundamental concept that their 
endsthe restoration of home rule and the establishment of white supremacy justified their 
means— coercion, intimidation, even murder.”116 White southerners held closely the belief that 
by keeping the freedmen in submission and limiting Republican interference, they could protect 
                                                 
110
 Warren Rogers, “The Boyd Incident,” 318. 
111
 Testimony of Francis S. Lyon, KKK Reports, Alabama, 10: 1421. 
112
 Warren Rogers, “The Boyd Incident,” 317 
113
 Ibid., 321.  
114
 Testimony of Luther Smith, KKK Reports, Alabama, 8: 101. 
115
 Fitzgerald, Splendid Failure, 66. 
116
 Warren Rogers, “The Boyd Incident,” 318. 
49 
southern society. To white southerners the former slaves and the Republicans who assisted them 
were barely worthy to be considered human let alone the victims of crimes. In Klansmen’s eyes 
they were simply cutting down the tree that blocked the road.  
This pattern developed throughout Reconstruction. Because the state courts could not or 
would not convict perpetrators of racial crimes, the newly formed Justice Department 
eventually had so many cases involving the Enforcement Act that many Klansmen never made it 
to trial and hundreds of violators slipped through the cracks. Throughout the South, Northern 
Republicans continued to battle Southern Democrats and Klansmen to bring violators to justice. 
With the end of Reconstruction in 1877, the United States reversed much of the progress made 
by the Republicans and the South reverted to a close reflection of its antebellum way of life.   
 During Reconstruction, however, Eutaw faced many difficulties. The majority of citizens 
feared the Klan. White Democrats tied to the Klan maintained dominance over the small town 
even with blacks outnumbering whites in Greene County. The few white Republicans who 
resided in Eutaw could not help the main body of free blacks. When they did attempt to provide 
help, they faced the threat of violence or the noose. Eutaw became a prime example of the worst 
possible outcome of Reconstruction. The federal government could not maintain control of the 
Black Belt counties, and Greene County in particular had a ferocious amount of Klan activity 
considering the small numbers of white Democrats who resided in the county.  
 The military failed the town of Eutaw when General Meade pardoned men who blatantly 
attacked a white Republican just because of his political affiliations. This failure provided the 
Klan with more power. By giving even more power and control to Democrats the military 
emboldened them. With this new power Democrats and Klansmen took it upon themselves to 
attack Alexander Boyd, who was not only a white Republican but also a state official. The Klan 
50 
believed that the laws did not apply to them and as a result Klan members faced no consequences 
and had no fear while riding in Eutaw.  
 The beginning of Reconstruction formed Eutaw into a hotbed of political activity, rife 
with tensions. A perfect mix of political turmoil and Klan violence formed a catalyst for fear. 
That fear and hatred between Republicans, both white and black, and Democrats continually 
festered. It only took two political meetings for the tension to spill over into racial upheaval and 
violence. Eutaw was on the brink of a catastrophe.  
 
51 
Chapter 2 - “Men or Measures”  
During Reconstruction the United States government enacted several new federal laws to 
protect citizens of the South. Government officials still struggled, however, with prosecuting 
offenders under these new laws. They faced the challenge of finding law breakers, having 
enough evidence to bring them to trial, and having an unbiased jury look at the facts and apply 
the law justly. On top of these hurdles the federal courts needed cases that would bring national 
attention to the issues, ones that could potentially make their way to the Supreme Court and 
establish precedence for all following court cases. Events in Eutaw progressively escalated 
during Reconstruction. In October of 1870, just before the election, Eutaw once again erupted in 
violence, presenting an opportunity for the local federal courts to rule on the new legislation. 
 After Eutaw distinguished itself as a town dominated by the violence of the Ku Klux 
Klan, the state government took notice. With the upcoming 1870 election, however, the situation 
paralyzed the state, specifically the Republican governor William Smith. Any action taken by the 
Alabama state government risked angering a large population of voters. Black Republicans and 
white Democrats were at opposite ends of a political spectrum, and no elected official could gain 
the support of both parties. Elected governor in 1868, Smith refused to form militias to aid the 
Black Belt counties because he did not want to turn white voters against the new state 
government.
1
  A southerner by birth, Smith was opposed to slavery and secession yet stayed in 
Alabama during the war, fleeing behind Union lines in 1862. After the war’s end he was 
nominated by Governor Lewis E. Parsons as judge to the tenth circuit court. Six months after his 
nomination, Smith resigned to help organize the Republican Party in Alabama. He was elected 
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Governor in 1868, becoming the first Republican governor in Alabama’s history.2 Smith feared 
that taking any action against the Klan would exacerbate political unrest and violence. However, 
it was very unlikely that any Democrat would switch to the Republican Party, regardless of what 
the governor did, or did not do. Smith could not count on the black vote either, because his lack 
of action thus far displeased the freedmen. According to historian John Sloan, “Smith could not 
hope to get the support of the Negroes, for his record had clearly alienated them. The Radical 
office holders throughout North Alabama had lost faith in him when they had pleaded time and 
time again for help in overcoming the Klan, only to find Smith adamantly against any militia and 
not overly anxious to use federal troops in the area.”3 
 It took the murder of Alexander Boyd in 1870 to prod Smith into action. The pleading 
letters of citizens and the Klan’s blatant disregard for the law could not be overlooked. Smith 
requested federal troops be sent to Greene County and stationed near the town of Eutaw. General 
Samuel Crawford supervised the ten soldiers, stationed in the county. In Crawford’s opinion 
Greene County desperately needed the troops’ presence.4 In fact Crawford believed that Eutaw in 
particular needed troops because of the Klan’s presence and control throughout the entire town. 
Democrats still controlled the town of Eutaw, even though more blacks resided there than whites. 
The former slaves were still subjected to white rule; the traditions of the South had not changed 
with the implementation of the Reconstruction legislation.  The town government and control of 
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the town never changed hands despite the large black majority, and blacks never had a 
participating faction in the leadership. Eutaw needed federal supervision just to maintain order.  
Crawford told the Congressional Committee later that “he made an earnest recommendation that 
troops should be sent to the town of Eutaw, and permanently kept there.”5  
No one quite knew what the new situation would hold. Would the federal troops’ 
presence be a permanent fixture or remain only until they restored order? If troops just stayed 
until Klan activity died down, what would stop the Klan’s resurgence as soon as the troops left?  
In June 1870 Republican Congressman Charles Hays wrote to General Crawford to request that 
troops remain in Alabama until after the November election. Hays believed the political climate 
leading up to the election would be dangerous for Republicans.
6
 In addition, Hays believed 
Democrats hated him and created a dangerous environment for him personally.  The closer to an 
election the more the Democrats fought to control the black vote. Democrats in the area thought 
differently. The Klan leader and prominent lawyer J. J.  Jolly, for example, believed Greene 
County did not need federal troops and that Eutaw had “the ability to enforce the law and protect 
life, liberty, and property in [their] own courts and under [their] own laws.”7 But by their “own 
courts” and “own laws” Jolly meant the Klan’s courts and the Klan’s laws. Both Hays and Jolly 
became unofficial spokesmen for their respective parties.  
 By October 1870 the political tensions in the area boiled over. With an election 
imminent, nominees traveled the country side to political meetings drumming up support for 
their respective parties. A delegation had nominated Charles Hays for Congress once again and 
he traveled across his district giving speeches. Eutaw created a problem for Hays, however. 
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Democrats in the area disliked him so much he felt unsafe at any political rally. He believed his 
life would be endangered if he spoke alone in Eutaw and as a result he asked fellow Republicans 
Governor Smith, Senator William Warner, and the former Governor Lewis Parsons a recent 
Republican convert, to speak with him on October 21.
8
 His fellow Republicans agreed and 
posters advertising the rally with the three men went up on October 12. It is unclear why Hays 
did not hold the meeting at his plantation as he had done previously. Perhaps he thought a 
meeting in town would draw more attention than a purely Republican meeting held at Hays 
Mount. 
The so-called “Eutaw Riot” broke out when Democrats planned a political rally in Eutaw 
for the same date. Posters advertising a Democratic rally went up all over Eutaw on the same day 
as Republican posters. 
9
 Senator Warner saw the Democratic posters advertising various speakers 
from the state senate. Warner recognized, however, that these Democrats were committed to 
speak elsewhere in the state on that particular date.
10
 The Democrats responsible for organizing 
the meeting told differing stories; some claimed they had no idea that the Republican rally was 
set for October 21. Others claimed they thought it best to hold their meeting at the same time as 
the Republican meeting to keep the Democrats away from the Republican rally and hopefully 
keep the violence at bay.
11
 However, it is difficult to believe that Democrats hoped to avoid 
conflict with the Republicans when they deliberately scheduled a meeting for the same place and 
time. Because most political meetings involved alcohol, moreover, it was unlikely that drunken 
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white Democrats would avoid black Republicans. Democrats were also forced to admit that they 
advertised speakers on their fliers before they checked the speaker’s availability. Not one man 
advertised on the Democrats’ poster actually spoke at the rally.12 In all likelihood the Democrats 
scheduled the rally and expected either violence against the black Republicans or, at the very 
least, an opportunity to intimidate the black voters immediately before the upcoming election. 
 Both the Democratic and Republican rallies met on October 21 at Eutaw’s courthouse. 
This same courthouse had been burned two years earlier by John Hunnicutt, the same man who 
worked closely with J.J. Jolly to organize the Klan in neighboring Hale County. After the fire 
“the people of Greene County rebuilt their courthouse on the same foundation, using the same 
elevation and plan of the original courthouse, but building with brick instead of wood.”13 Both 
Republicans and Democrats commonly used the courthouse for political meetings in Eutaw, 
however, these party meetings usually took place on different days and different times. This time 
they would meet simultaneously on opposite sides of the courthouse. Democrats and 
Republicans rarely mixed in heated debates where violence did not ensue. Republican leaders 
worried about the concurrently scheduled meeting when they approached the courthouse on 
October 21. Republicans requested to meet with General Crawford and the sheriff before the 
rally began. They discussed the option of bringing the troops stationed outside of Eutaw into 
town to maintain order.
14
 With most Democrats against the troops’ presence in general, the 
Republicans feared a violent altercation if soldiers came into town. Thus Crawford stationed the 
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men half a mile outside of town and Republicans thought if something went wrong the army 
could get to the courthouse in time.
15
  
Trying to alleviate some tension, Hays suggested that the two political parties combine 
meetings and have a debate, a strange request in light of ongoing political violence. County 
Judge William Miller composed a note to send to the Democratic leaders asking if they would 
consider debating the Republicans. The note read, “To The President of the Democratic Club:  
We propose to appoint a committee of two to confer with a committee on your part of two, to 
arrange terms of discussion today.”16 According to the leaders of the Democratic Party, J.J.  
Jolly, William Morgan, and John Pierce, Democrats received only a verbal invitation to debate 
from the Republicans. The Democrats, in turn, requested that the invitation be in writing and 
they claimed they did not receive the written letter before beginning their own meeting.
17
 The 
Republicans received a note from Jolly and Pierce, declining a debate “believing that the issues 
as to men or measures in that canvass were not debatable.”18 The Democrats in Eutaw believed 
that the Republicans, white Republicans especially, were traitors to their race who did not 
deserve a debate. The parties were so divided that a debate would serve no purpose. 
 Still worried about the potential for violence, the Republican leaders met with the sheriff 
who told Warner he would clear the courthouse so the Republicans could meet at the steps. 
Later, the plan for having the meeting on the courthouse steps had to be altered, and the group 
put a table outside the circuit clerk’s office window. The clerk locked his door with the intention 
of blocking any trouble from the inside; if violence broke out it would be from only one 
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direction.
19
 Hays told the former governor, Lewis Parsons, that he had a derringer in his pocket if 
any difficulties did arise.
20
   
 At this point the narrative of events becomes conflicting. The Republicans and 
Democrats– not surprisingly–told differing stories of the events that followed the beginning of 
the Republican meeting. Republicans testified to the Congressional Investigating Committee that 
almost immediately after they began their meeting, Democrats adjourned and crossed the yard to 
join the Republicans. According to Republican witnesses, the Democrats became hostile 
immediately.
21
 Republicans and Democrats alike recognized many Eutaw citizens in both the 
parties’ meetings, but they also saw several faces from neighboring areas in the crowd. Many 
men from Mississippi attended the rally, as did known Klansmen from across the state.
22
 Ryland 
Randolph, the editor of the Tuscaloosa Independent Monitor, who had helped form a Klan in 
Tuscaloosa County, unsurprisingly, attended the meeting in Eutaw.
23
 With a meeting so close to 
the election, Eutaw drew many interested parties.  
 Republican William Warner had spoken in Eutaw on several previous occasions. Two 
years ago Democrats had refused to let him speak because he originated from the North. While 
Democrats hated Charles Hays, who was a southerner by birth, Warner was a Carpetbagger. The 
only thing Southern Democrats hated more than a Carpetbag Republican was a local white 
Scalawag Republican.
24
 When Warner got up to speak that day in Eutaw, Republican witnesses 
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claimed the Democrats in the audience continually yelled phrases such as “damned liar,” and 
“[d]amned carpet-bagger.”25 These insults, along with many other rude and distracting 
comments, upset Warner so much that he eventually cut his speech short. Warner had spoken 
across the entire State of Alabama, and nowhere else had Democrats or Republicans interrupted, 
insulted, and threatened him personally like the audience members did in Eutaw.
26
 
 When former Governor Parsons took the stand to speak, he recognized several of the 
Democrats in the audience who had been in Livingston, Alabama, at a rally the day before.
27
 As 
a former prominent Democrat who had converted to the Republican Party in 1869, Parsons 
would have recognized many Democrats.
28
 Although no violence had taken place in Livingston, 
the appearance of Democrats aroused Parsons’ suspicion. During the former Governor’s speech 
the county clerk of Greene County, Arthur Smith, saw a Democrat named Robert Hamblett 
threaten the governor: “Let me kill the God-damned old son of a bitch.”29 Hamblett pulled out a 
derringer but his comrades held him back saying, “Don’t shoot yet, it’s not time.”30 Smith 
testified that deputy Sheriff, Hugh L. White, came into Smith’s office during former Governor 
Parson’s speech and told him, “Smith, you will see the damnedest row here in a little while that 
you ever saw in your life.” 31 Smith’s testimony suggests that the Democrats came to the 
Republican meeting already planning to make trouble. While Republicans spoke, the Democrats 
ventured closer to the table that served as a podium. One Democrat climbed up on the table and 
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sat on the window ledge behind the speaker. Eventually the man climbed into the office of the 
courthouse.
32
 At this point Democrats completely surrounded the white Republicans.  
 Recognizing that the situation was becoming dangerous, Hays decided to forgo his 
speech and adjourn the meeting. He feared for his own safety as well as for that of other 
Republicans.
33
 Democrats yelled and called for him to take the stand, but as soon as he began to 
speak one man pulled Hays to the ground while others tilted the table over.
34
 The sheriff 
intervened and took that offender into the courthouse as several Democrats followed. According 
to Republicans, after Hays fell to the ground Democrats fired into the crowd of blacks from the 
windows, doors, and around the corners of the courthouse.
35
 Smith, the clerk, heard a man yell, 
“Go in, boys; now is your time.”36 Smith could not see who yelled the command but he believed 
that John J. Jolly delivered the orders to the Democrats.
37
 At this point chaos broke out across 
both groups.  
 Senator Warner approached a contingent of Democrats and pleaded with them to stop, 
but one of these men pointed a gun toward Warner and former Governor Parsons. The man with 
the gun intended to fire until he saw Charles Hays. He then changed targets and aimed the 
derringer at Hays. He fired at Hays and missed, but the sheriff stopped the man before he could 
fire again at the Congressman.
38
 As more Democrats began to join in the disarray, the blacks 
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fled.
39
 They tore down the gate around the courthouse and ran down the street. As they ran 
Warner heard a voice from the Democrats shout, “Boys, hold your fire!”40 Some Democrats 
attempted to stop the violence, while many others pursued the blacks down the street. By this 
time the federal troops had been notified and they approached the courthouse. The troops 
blocked the whites’ attempts at pursuing the blacks.41 With the timely intervention of the federal 
troops the riot ended. 
 As the riot came to a close someone knocked Senator Warner’s cap off. The Democrats 
kicked the hat back and forth like a schoolyard game, while Warner tried to get it back. A 
Democrat approached Warner and politely told him he was not safe and for his best interest he 
should forget the hat and leave the area. Later Warner saw the man at a restaurant and thanked 
him again for his advice. The man accepted the thanks and again suggested Warner leave the 
area. The riot had ended, but Republicans were still in danger.
42
 Similarly another witness, 
William Miller, had his hat knocked off his head during the riot. Miller told friends he believed 
John Reynolds purposely knocked his hat off. A month after the riot Reynolds assaulted Miller 
on the street with a walking stick and told him, “God damn you, if you ever tell of this I will kill 
you.”43   
Many of the Republicans and Democrats at the meeting turned riot knew each other well. 
The Eutaw Riot was not a covert act of the Klan where all members were masked. These 
Democrats and Republicans were neighbors and citizens of the same community. Even the few 
men from Mississippi and Livingston who traveled to assist the Greene County Democrats in 
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breaking up the meeting, were not complete strangers to the town’s residents. While former 
Governor Parsons rode the train back to Talladega after the riot, he heard men talking to each 
other. They claimed, “we have cleaned out the damned radicals, and are going home.”44 Another 
man returning from a trip to neighboring Hale County met men leaving Greene County. They 
told him they had “been over there and made the radicals jump once, and would again if they had 
a meeting.”45 Democrats, especially those who maintained a brotherhood in a secret society, 
made a habit of assisting members from around the area.  
 Democrats told their own version of events at the riot. Every accusation Republican 
witnesses made against the Democrats, the Democrats deflected or denied. According to 
Democratic witnesses no one heckled or harassed the Republican speakers. John Pierce, a 
leading Democrat, claimed he asked former Governor Parsons informed and intelligent 
questions− not to harass the governor but to spur on a good, calm debate.46 J.J. Jolly 
corroborated Pierce’s story; the Democrats never harassed the Republicans. Democrats 
innocently wanted a fair debate and if Republicans were so weak that tough questions irritated 
them the Democrats could not be blamed. According to Jolly, at one point the sheriff asked if 
Jolly would patrol for trouble. As a result Jolly took a few men who had been drinking into the 
courthouse to avoid any violence outside.
47
 From Jolly’s perspective, he protected the 
Republicans and tried to make the meeting a safe and good natured debate. 
 Democrats even claimed that Republicans were not fond of their own speakers. Historian 
Walter Fleming, a member of the Dunning School wrote, “One man who was to speak, Charles 
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Hays, was so obnoxious to the whites that even the Radicals were unwilling for him to speak.”48 
Democrats assumed that because they hated Hays, no honorable man could support him. In fact 
Hays became a topic of heated debate. Republicans insisted Democrats pulled Hays off the table 
and fired shots, while many Democrats accused Hays of firing the first shot. William Warner 
later said this accusation was “ridiculous,” because if Hays had fired the first shot or ordered the 
blacks to fire Warner would have heard the command.
49
 According to Jolly’s account of the 
incident, a black Democrat wanted to take the stand with Hays. The man pulled Hays down and 
after Hays fell all of the Republican blacks rushed forward to start a riot.
50
 This story is curious 
because in a town dominated by the Ku Klux Klan it is unusual to have any black members of 
the Democratic Party. Jolly went on to claim that John Reynolds, the same man who would later 
assault Judge William Miller in Eutaw, attempted to help this unknown black Democrat up onto 
the stand.
51
 
 The Mobile Daily Register, a notoriously Democratic newspaper, reported, “As soon as 
[Hays] fell, he ordered the negroes, in a loud and peremptory voice, to fire on the whites, 
repeating the order or command several times.”52 The Eutaw Whig and Observer also reported 
that Hays fell and then ordered his supporters to fire.
53
 It is relevant to point out that Democrats 
ran both papers. The Mobile Daily Register, edited by John Forsyth, became an influential paper 
for the South. Forsyth, an avid Democrat, had hoped his paper could “control the votes of the ex-
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slaves but when this proved futile, Forsyth’s bitter racial animosity burst out unchecked.”54 
Forsyth’s paper constantly defended the South and Democrats alike. No newspaper account 
could be read without a distinct political bias. Thus “Forsyth’s steadfast, single-minded but 
multifaceted defense of the South made his Mobile Daily Register Alabama’s most important 
organ for urging Southern resistance to Radical rule and the perceived threat of racial 
upheaval.”55  
Before the riot the Register had a circulation of five thousand for the daily paper and 
twenty thousand for the weekly. This made it the second largest paper in the South, behind only 
the Louisville Courier Journal.
56
 This paper is important in understanding southerners’ views 
during Reconstruction, as historian Carl Osthaus wrote, “The Register never viewed the 
freedmen as responsible agents of Reconstruction but, rather, considered them dupes of Northern 
Radicals.” Thus “A steady diet of such rhetorical abuse reinforced Southern prejudices and 
helped deny to the Republicans any recognition as loyal, respectable opponents who could be 
trusted with the reins of government.”57 It is important to realize that such biased papers with 
such large circulations, would influence the public and consequently the potential jury if a trial 
were to take place. 
 Eventually the debate regarding the Eutaw Riot boiled down to one question: who shot 
first? By pointing to Charles Hays, Democrats could demonstrate not only that disorderly blacks 
followed the orders of a Scalawag, but also that Democrats were there to maintain peace and 
order. Democrats insisted that blacks should submit to Democratic rule for the blacks’ own 
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good− not surprisingly the same argument used to justify slavery. As historian Eyre Damer 
points out, “The pistol shot which followed so quickly the rude interruption of Hays’ remarks 
was not the real cause of the riot; it was the signal for the opening of a conflict which had been 
impending for some time, and it gave vent to indignation which had been suppressed with 
difficulty.”58 Despite Democratic excuses, it stands to reason that the Democrats were 
responsible for the riot. It is difficult to believe that a sitting Congressman would fire into a 
crowd mixed with his black supporters and Democrats. It makes more sense to conclude that 
Democrats who admittedly hated Hays would blame the start of the violence on him. 
 After the shooting began Democrats claimed that Republicans shot John Pierce, a lawyer 
in Eutaw and a leader of the Democratic Party. In fact, Pierce later found a bullet hole in his 
pants’ leg.59 The shot went “just about the thigh, about four inches from the crotch; it entered the 
back part and went through.”60 Pierce believed a black man near the entrance of the courthouse 
shot at him.
61
  Democratic gubernatorial candidate Robert Lindsay also reported Pierce had been 
shot by blacks, because all the whites fired into the air.
62
 According to both J.J. Jolly and Pierce, 
blacks had planned for the violence because they were all armed and shooting at the 
Democrats.
63
 In retaliation “the whites began firing, principally into the air.”64 Claiming that 
whites all fired upwards, Pierce stated, “I thought it was all fun; I had no idea anybody was 
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shooting at anybody. I got on the table, and laughed extravagantly at the way the negroes were 
flying and running about; they broke down the court-house palings jumping over.”65 The Mobile 
Daily Register reported that the blacks fled but then rallied, coming back to face the whites. 
According to the paper federal troops came into town, but whites assured them they were not 
needed and the troops moved on.
66
 There are no military reports that corroborate this part of the 
story. 
 Even after the riot, reports continued to differ. Republicans generally reported more 
blacks injured or killed by the violence, while Democrats reported fewer injuries and deaths. 
Charles Hays saw two injured black men lying on the grounds of the courthouse whom he was 
convinced would die.
67
 The Mobile Daily Register claimed two white men suffered wounds and 
many whites narrowly escaped death, as they had multiple bullet holes in their clothes. The 
Register also reported that twenty-five or thirty blacks sustained wounds with two dead.
68
 This 
report is not corroborated by any of the leading Republicans or Democrats. Jolly believed that 
two white men suffered injuries along with perhaps twenty blacks, and according to him no 
blacks died.
69
 Another Democrat at the riot, James Clark, later testified that no more than four 
blacks were wounded, while none died.
70
  Newly elected Democratic Governor Lindsay claimed 
that only two blacks were injured and other black Republicans actually injured them.
71
 Historians 
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generally report the Eutaw Riot killed four black Republicans and wounded between twenty-four 
and fifty-four more.
72
 Witness’ accounts vary too much to give a reliable number of injured. 
 In what appeared to be a benevolent act by a Democrat, John Pierce claimed he offered to 
pay the medical bills for a black man with a broken thigh whom Pierce passed on his way 
home.
73
 This account seems suspect because Pierce was the only person, Democrat or 
Republican, to note this selfless act. Pierce also told of his apparent selflessness when another 
Democrat filed a complaint against the black man who had supposedly shot at Pierce during the 
riot. When authorities asked Pierce to testify, he refused, because he wanted the whole matter 
over with. Moreover, he claimed, he could not accurately identify the black man because they all 
appeared too similar.
74
 
 The Eutaw Riot dwindled to a close, but the effects were far reaching. The Riot’s timing 
was critical. It was only a couple of weeks before the November 1870 elections. Two weeks 
allowed Democrats the perfect amount of time to use the riot to their advantage. Blacks feared 
the repercussions of their votes, because the riot and the violence were not far removed. The 
Eutaw events also ended many of the Republicans’ campaigns. Two weeks did not give 
Republican leaders enough time to build back the confidence of their black supporters. The riot 
itself “was no small incident for a former governor and a sitting governor, Congressman, and 
U.S. senator to be mobbed. The Eutaw Riot, the most spectacular extension of violence directed 
at Fourth District Republicans, marked the end of the 1870 campaign for Hays.” 75 The Mobile 
Daily Register advised blacks to “Strengthen the power of the party that would save you and 
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your children from untold evils. No matter what you have thought before, vote this time the only 
way that an honest and virtuous citizen can vote and an approving conscience will say ‘right’ to 
you for the rest of your life.”76 Effectively the riot did exactly what Democrats had intended it to 
do; it frightened Republicans away from the polls and gave Democrats the 1870 election.
77
 
 The election itself became as controversial as the riot. Republicans insisted the polls had 
been tampered with, while Democrats saw no proof. After the election Senator Warner 
maintained that the counts had been falsified, and that the violence and fear instilled by the 
Democrats kept blacks from voting.
78
 One reason for Republicans’ suspicions appeared to be that 
all poll keepers in the election were Democrats appointed by the Democratic sheriff and the 
Republican Probate judge.
79
  Republicans insisted that an election run purely by Democrats with 
no Republican supervision needed to be investigated further. The numbers in the election also 
became suspect. In the 1868 election Republican Hays had won by a majority of 2,600 votes, 
roughly the same number of freedmen living in the county, while Democrats only earned 800 
votes. In Greene County a total of around 3,400 ballots were cast. Two years later in the 1870 
election, with the same number of ballots cast, the Democrats took the election with a majority of 
forty-three votes.
80
   The 1870 election had the same number of ballots cast as the 1868 election, 
but the votes switched from a Republican majority to a Democratic majority− yet very few 
blacks even voted.
81
 The problem did not lie with black Republicans switching parties but with 
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their just not voting. If they did not go to the polls− where did the Democratic votes come from? 
Democratic fraud seemed clear to Republicans.  
 When asked, Democrats insisted that their party legitimately lost votes in the 1870 
election because of the Eutaw Riot. They believed that the black Republicans would have voted 
the Democratic ticket, but because of the violence the freedmen did not vote. 
82
 Robert Lindsay, 
who was elected Governor in the election, claimed that Democrats would have had 500 more 
votes had it not been for the violence in Eutaw. Lindsay also believed that Charles Hays had 
become so hated that he drove black voters to the Democratic ticket.
83
 Another Democrat 
discussed the election saying, “I can tell you why it fell off in several cases. Major Hays was 
known in Alabama as a most cruel master that ever lived in that country before and during the 
war; and it is common reputation that he gave orders to the negroes for their services upon men 
who never paid them.”84 Jolly agreed, testifying that the freedmen did not like Hays because 
Hays did not pay them.
85
 Yet, Hays had a large following of black supporters before the election, 
and the violence at Eutaw was not between Hays and blacks. The Democratic argument that 
Hays alienated his supporters seems unlikely. 
 Historians have been divided over the topic of the 1870 election in Alabama. John Sloan 
wrote, in 1965, “Two things are certain in the disputed election of 1870. The Ku Klux Klan 
activities cannot be accredited with an intimidation of voters, as more votes were cast then than 
in the election of 1868. Nor can the Klan and /or the Democrats be blamed for fraud.”86 Yet, 
historian Eric Foner wrote in 1988, “The Alabama returns revealed that Democrats could not 
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have carried the state in a peaceful election, for the decline in the Republican vote in Greene 
County alone (scene of the Eutaw riot and numerous other acts of terror), exceeded Governor 
Lindsay’s entire statewide majority.”87 The evidence seems to prove Foner correct. It is overly 
optimistic to believe Democrats would not tamper with the election they so desperately wanted 
to win. The numbers are too coincidental to be accurate. Based solely on the population of 
Alabama, especially the Black Belt and Greene County, Republicans had a clear majority. 
Election fraud clearly won the day for the Democrats. 
 It is safe to deduce that the riot at Eutaw was premeditated by the Democrats. It provided 
a key opportunity to assert Democratic power in Eutaw and Greene County. Democrats knew the 
importance of the 1870 election and prepared for victory by force, intimidation, and deception. 
Republicans once again fell victim to the strong arm of the Democrats. However, as with the 
murder of Alexander Boyd, the violence caught the attention of government officials. Instead of 
the state government looking for justice, the federal government took notice of the small 
Alabama town. Eutaw created an opportunity for the federal government to prosecute on a larger 
scale under the newly enacted First Enforcement Act. The key evidence seemed to be there for a 
swift and just trial, but as with many other trials in the South justice was not forthcoming. 
 After the riot neither Greene County nor the State of Alabama arrested any white 
offenders.  With conflicting evidence provided by both sides and the fact that only blacks were 
wounded in the riot, the state did arrest Henry Hamlet an African American Democrat accused of 
firing the first shot.
88
 Hamlet may have been the black Democrat whom Reynolds assisted up 
onto the podium. However, it is interesting to note that although Democrats identified Hamlet as 
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a Democrat, he never identified himself with the party. The state never pursued any white 
Democrats involved in the violence. Two months after the riot, in December 1870, one of the 
unknown Democratic participants beat a Republican newspaperman. County clerk Arthur Smith 
testified to the Congressional Investigating Committee that a man whom he could not name 
attacked the Republican newspaperman. Smith identified the individual as one of the Democratic 
rioters. Neither the state nor the newspaperman filed charges for the assault.
89
 Republicans in 
Greene County, however, began to feel that Democrats stood above the law; there would be no 
justice in town for fear of the Ku Klux Klan and its retribution.
90
 When the Congressional 
Committee asked Judge William Miller if he believed that “prominent men engaged in business 
will not take a stand for the purpose of bringing these people to punishment,” 91 Miller replied, “I 
say exactly that.”92 When asked, “what chance is there for the State Courts to suppress this 
violence, if no indictments are found,” Republican Arthur Smith replied, “No chance; I look 
upon the State Courts as a farce, so far as that is concerned… I think I can speak very confidently 
of the circuit court of Greene County, that it is utterly powerless to convict these men, or any 
parties guilty of these crimes.”93 In Greene County all county officials were white Democrats 
except for the Republican probate judge, Luther Smith.
94
  Even a Democratic state solicitor was 
appointed after the murder of Boyd.
95
 With so many Democrats in positions of power, selecting 
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an impartial jury and promising safety to witnesses who testified proved to be an impossible task 
for the state courts.
96
 
Democrats denied these allegations. They claimed that Republicans were not upstanding 
citizens and people in the area could not trust the Republican government officials. One 
Democrat told the Congressional Committee, “Our judges have been unknown to the people, and 
some of them have incurred the prejudices of the people, and where that is the case it is not as 
easy a matter to administer the laws as where they have confidence in the judge, and respect for 
his character and standing.”97 Democrats attempted to discredit not only Republicans but any 
laws which Democrats viewed as the result of Republican actions. Democrats refused to 
acknowledge the credibility of the new Enforcement Act by arguing that it was unconstitutional. 
The Constitution did not give the federal government the express powers given in the 
Enforcement Acts and thus the Act was unconstitutional.
98
 The Democrats’ simpler argument 
became that because the Constitution did not directly state that the federal government had the 
right to arrest and convict citizens under the Enforcement Act, the Act itself was 
unconstitutional. The Mobile Daily Register published the Enforcement Act in its entirety 
99
 and 
the next day another article called it an “act to destroy the last lingering traditions of State 
Rights, to constitute a civil and military Dictatorship, and for other purposes.”100 
The government originally intended the Enforcement Act to be, as the title suggests, a 
way to enforce the newly ratified amendments to the United States Constitution. Yet because of 
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Democrats’ refusal to cooperate at the local level, the federal government became responsible for 
justice on a mass scale.
101
 This proved to be a difficult task.  The sheer number of crimes and the 
limited personnel and financial resources hampered the Justice Department in prosecuting the 
crimes. The number of individuals to be prosecuted and the large space in which they operated 
simply overwhelmed the federal government officials available to do the job.
102
  
 The federal government was working in untried territory. Prosecution was difficult. Many 
citizens assisted suspects by hiding them, helping them resist arrest, or helping them run from the 
law.
103
 Across the South many citizens took up collections for the defense of Klansmen in 
federal court.
104
 The federal government had to clear numerous hurdles when prosecuting 
individuals under the Enforcement Act. To make sure that cases could be prosecuted, it was 
essential that district attorneys frame indictments that would stand up in court.  
 Republican Sam Brown, a witness, provided the testimony on which Republicans framed 
the indictments of the Democrats on federal charges.
105
 Circuit Judge William B. Woods took 
down Brown’s account personally.106 Woods, a native Ohioan, practiced law and originally 
voted the Democratic ticket in the Ohio legislature. During the Civil War he joined the Army and 
impressed both Generals Grant and Sherman. After the war Grant appointed Woods to the Fifth 
Circuit Court, where he then heard Sam Brown’s version of events at the Eutaw Riot.107 The 
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government filed the charges on October 29, 1870, just eight days after the riot. The documents 
charged several Democrats in the cases, including William C. Hall, under whose name the case 
would be filed; J.J. Jolly, the leader of both the Democrats and the Klan in Greene County; Jo 
Reynolds, accused of encouraging Democrats during the rally and assault afterwards; Hugh L. 
White, a deputy sheriff; and William Pettigrew, formerly a Eutaw Prisoner sent to the Dry 
Tortugas.
108
 The government indicted all defendants under the 1870 Enforcement Act.  
Responsibility for framing the indictments was assumed by John P. Southworth, recently 
appointed by Ulysses S. Grant, on April 20, 1869, as District Attorney for the Southern District 
of Alabama.
109
 Southworth a thirty-six year old native of Illinois also held the position of District 
Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama at the time of the riot.
110
 He resigned his position 
to focus on the Southern District in December, 1870.  When framing the indictments Southworth 
used a broad interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, assuming that the “privileges and 
immunities” of the United States citizens were the same rights listed in the Bill of Rights 
including free speech and freedom of assembly. As historian Charles Lane writes, “In 
prosecuting the case, United States v. Hall, the U.S. attorney in Alabama, John P. Southworth, 
became one of the first Justice Department officials to attempt a practical definition of the rights 
protected by the Enforcement Act… In two separate counts, Southworth’s indictment charged 
the Klansmen with conspiring to violate two of the Republicans’ First Amendment rights: 
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freedom of speech and freedom of assembly.”111 The indictment also assumed that the new 
Fourteenth Amendment authorized the federal government to protect those rights when the states 
failed to do so. 
 The indictments accused the men of four separate crimes. First that the defendants “did 
unlawfully and feloniously band and conspire together with intent to injure, oppress, threaten and 
intimidate Willard Warner, Charles Hays, Lewis E. Parsons and Samuel B. Browne… with intent 
to prevent and hinder their free exercise and enjoyment of the right of freedom of speech, it 
being a right and privilege granted and secured to them by the Constitution of the United States 
of America.”112 The second charge against the defendants read similarly but only accused the 
defendants of preventing Charles Hays from speaking.
113
 The third charge against the defendants 
claimed that they “did unlawfully and feloniously band and conspire together with intent to 
injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate…good and lawful citizens of the United States of 
America with intent to prevent and hinder their free exercise and enjoyment of the right and 
privilege to peaceably assemble, it being a right and privilege granted and secured to them by the 
Constitution of the United States of America.”114 The fourth and final charge against the 
defendants read thus: “[the defendants] did unlawfully and feloniously band and conspire 
together with intent to injure, oppress, threaten and intimidate…good and lawful citizens of the 
United States of America with intent to prevent and hinder their free exercise and enjoyment of 
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the right of suffrage, it being a right granted and secured to them by the Constitution of the 
United States of America.”115  
  Before any trial could proceed, the county grand jury had to hear evidence and 
return true bills on the individuals. Yet, it proved difficult for the county to even assemble a 
grand jury.  The process of selecting jury members seemed simple as one clerk described it, “The 
probate judge, the clerk of the court, and the sheriff meet on the first Monday in January… select 
from the registered list of voters the names of those who are competent to serve as jurors.” Then 
twenty days before the trial names are drawn from a box to select the specific jury members. 
Several jurors did not appear at the trial. Many jurors explained that no one notified them of their 
duty and it appeared that two were threatened if they served on the jury, though details are 
unknown as to who threatened the jurors. 
116
  During the hearing the grand jury called four 
witnesses to testify in Mobile, Alabama. The jury summoned Greene County clerk Arthur Smith, 
and although Smith did not want to testify for fear of his testimony becoming public knowledge, 
the court assured Smith of the privacy of his remarks.
117
 However, not three days after he spoke 
to the jury the citizens of Greene County knew of his testimony and Smith once again began to 
fear for his safety.
118
 Unfortunately the court did not offer any protection for the witnesses. 
 Two witnesses to the riot, William Cockrell and William Cockrell Jr., testified against 
the defendants before the grand jury in Mobile. On a steamboat back to Greene County, the 
Cockrells were unable to get off at Eutaw due to flooding, thus they went three miles up the river 
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to Finch’s Ferry and stayed the night.119 Meanwhile, several men got on the boat looking for 
Judge Luthur Smith, who was to hold court in Eutaw the next day. While on the boat they found 
the elder William Cockrell and proceeded to beat him. William Cockrell Jr. identified one of his 
father’s assailants as Jo Reynolds, one of the defendants in the hearing.120  The assailants gave no 
indication as to why they beat Cockrell Sr., but it can be surmised it was because of Cockrell’s 
testimony earlier that same day. The local newspaper, The Eutaw Whig, claimed that the beating 
of Cockrell was in no way associated with his testimony, but based purely on his lack of 
character.
121
 These character flaws most likely were his Republican ties. It cannot be viewed as 
coincidental that the violence against Cockrell took place on the same day as his testimony, and 
that one of the defendants in the trial was an assailant. Cockrell’s beating was based solely on his 
testimony, a signal that breaking ranks among whites would not be tolerated. Attorney General 
Southworth hurriedly ordered the younger Cockrell out of the state to protect him from any other 
assault. The District Attorney needed his testimony.
122
  
 The grand jury’s fourth witness, Republican Congressman Charles Hays, refused to 
testify. When called Hays clearly recognized the dangers associated with testifying to a grand 
jury, as demonstrated in a letter to William Warner discussing the assault of William Cockrell. 
The letter asked Warner not to use Hays’ name for fear of being associated with the riot and the 
trial even more.
123
 Oddly, when the Congressional Committee questioned Hays he did not admit 
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to anxiety over his safety, perhaps due to fear of retribution.
124
 Fear of Klan retaliation was valid 
and understandable even years after an event. Many Republican leaders, including Willard 
Warner and county clerk Arthur Smith, believed that Hays feared the repercussions of his 
testimony.
125
  Smith stated, “I do not know what reason [Hays] gave here. I know that Major 
Hays told me that he was not only told, but written to, that in case he did go there and testify, it 
would jeopardize his family and himself.”126 Hays knew the Democrats in the county despised 
him, and if he testified against them he would be not only despised, but also a marked man.
127
 
Hays declined to answer any of the grand jury’s questions and asked Circuit Court Judge Luther 
Smith to excuse him from the hearing.
128
 According to Hays, there were other witnesses to give 
testimony, so his presence was not required.
129
 Hays, moreover, disagreed with prosecuting the 
Democratic rioters because a trial would affect the voter turnout.
130
 He told the Congressional 
Committee that “it would be far preferable for [the] section of the State not to have this 
testimony published at this time… If the testimony should be published… it would be necessary 
to send troops there; and [citizens] want to get along if [they] can possibly do so.”131 Hays 
naively argued that if there was no trial and no one complained about the state of affairs in 
Alabama, the military would leave and Eutaw would be left in peace. 
132
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 The government held the defendants in custody, however, and the case began to garner 
attention throughout Alabama. White citizens held a fair to raise funds for the defense of the men 
on trial.
133
 The Mobile Daily Register reported, “At a concert given for the purpose by the ladies 
of Eutaw, $80 was raised for the benefit of the young gentleman of that town now on trial at 
Mobile.”134 Also, the Queen Sisters, a popular singing group, gave a concert to benefit the men 
on trial.
135
 Democrats adamantly campaigned to have the defendants released. Several 
Democratic leaders went to County Judge William Miller, requesting that he talk to the District 
Attorney and have all the charges dropped.
136
 Miller was the same judge who had been assaulted 
by Democrats and whose nephew, Alexander Boyd, had been murdered by the Klan just a year 
earlier. Miller later told the Congressional Committee that justice would never be served because 
witnesses refused to come forward.
137
 Charles Hays agreed, telling the Committee that if the 
government did convict rioters then the witnesses would not be able to “live in the country.”138 It 
appeared that an unwritten rule allowed citizens to testify in a general manner but when the 
courts wanted a citizen to point specifically at an offender, or in a case where an individual might 
be convicted, the townspeople feared for their safety. 
 The federal Judiciary Act of 1869 organized the circuit court system by creating nine 
independent circuit court judges; one judge was assigned to each of the nine circuits. One major 
requirement was that each judge must be a resident of the circuits for which he rode. These 
circuit judges effectively had the same duties within the circuit as the U.S. Supreme Court judge 
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who was also assigned to that circuit. Though the Supreme Court justices were still required to 
sit on the circuit court, most cases were heard jointly by the district judge and the new circuit 
judge.  Lou Falkner Williams writes that “Republican lawmakers hoped that this two-headed 
court with one judge from outside the immediate area would enhance the national interest by 
decreasing the favoritism toward parochial interests which was often displayed in the district 
courts.”139 This two headed system created an interesting dynamic because of the possibility of 
having a disagreement of opinion. If an instance occurred in which the two judges divided on a 
verdict or point of law, the case could be sent up to the Supreme Court on a division of opinion. 
This gave judges an opportunity to strategically send cases up through the ranks of the court 
system and attorneys an alternative to the appeals process.
140
 The more important federal cases 
were generally held in the circuit court rather than district court. 
The grand jury decided to send U.S. v. Hall to the circuit court and the trial commenced 
on April 24, 1871 with Circuit Judge William B. Woods and District Judge Richard Busteed 
sitting jointly on the bench. A week after the court opened, on May 1, Judge Woods sustained 
one demurrer, claiming the court had no grounds to try the defendants, and overruled others.
141
 
The absence of Hays’ testimony hampered the prosecution and the District Attorney. Southworth 
had testimony from many Democrats claiming that Hays fired first. Hays became a necessary 
witness for the prosecution who attempted to prove that Hays had not fired the first shots. 
Federal attorney Southworth also wanted to show that the Democrats on trial had conspired 
against the Republicans and initiated the gunfire.
142
 Without Hays the prosecution was not yet 
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prepared to try the case. Busteed later told the Congressional Committee, “… Those cases were 
adjourned upon motion of the Government for the term. The Government was not ready to try 
them when we held circuit court last at Mobile… At the insistence of the defendants, but upon 
the necessities of the Government; the Government was not ready to try them, and the court was 
of the opinion that the defendants ought not to be longer held; that they were entitled to either 
postponement or a trial.”143 In the court documentation District Attorney Southworth wrote, 
“Charles Hays is an important and material witness for the Government…without whose 
testimony the United States could not safely go to trial on a former day of this tenure of court 
and the said cause was therefore continued until the next term of this court on account of the 
absence of the said witness Charles Hays.”144 The prosecution had every intention of 
subpoenaing Hays and the court postponed the trial until the following term commenced. 
 The Eutaw Riot began simply as a violent attack against Republicans. However with the 
federal government’s attempts to bring the Democrats to justice, the events, the trial, and the 
enforcement efforts took on a larger role. The trial presented the opportunity to interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment for the first time. The court hoped not only to bring the Klan to justice 
but, more importantly, make the legal connections between the Bill of Rights, the privileges and 
immunities of American citizenship, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the Enforcement Act. 
These important implications are the reason that District Attorney Southworth and Judge 
William B. Woods actively sought to continue the trial until the next term and achieve a guilty 
verdict against the defendants.  
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Chapter 3 - “Vain and Idle Enactment”  
 The Civil War not only split the nation, but it split the small town of Eutaw, 
Alabama. With the expansion of the Republican Party within the small town, the tensions 
between Republicans and Democrats finally boiled over in October 1870. The riot started 
a two year battle in the nation’s courts to define the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the legality of the 1870 Enforcement Act. Democrats and Republicans 
told differing stories of the events and because of the scope of the violence, it fell to the 
United States government to find out who committed a crime. The town of Eutaw again 
can be viewed as a microcosm of the larger struggles of southern Reconstruction. The 
town faced backlash after the war, then suffered violently at the hands of Klansmen; now 
the town struggled in the courts to breathe meaning into the new Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Enforcement Acts. With every step the federal government took on a large scale, 
Eutaw, Alabama reacted on a smaller scale. Studying the reactions of the citizens of 
Eutaw provides insight into the reaction of the South to Reconstruction and 
Reconstruction’s ultimate failure.   
 Citizens of the town were not the only actors in the story of Reconstruction; the 
courts played a major role. The reaction of the federal courts to the Eutaw riot, the 
testimony, and the resulting jury decision affected not only the defendants but also the 
very laws under which the government brought them to trial. The government was 
attempting to establish a broad interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 1870 
Enforcement Act.  To legitimize the Reconstruction Acts judges needed to uphold the 
indictments framed under the new law. To bring justice to the Republicans, a jury needed 
82 
to find the defendants guilty of a federal violation, an outcome the government believed 
to be clearly evident.  
 The trial of the rioters had been postponed into the next term of the Fifth Circuit 
Court in January 1872, because key witnesses failed to testify, specifically Charles Hays. 
Whereas two judges sat jointly in the previous session (April 1871) Judge Woods held 
this next term (January 1872) of the court alone. Without District Judge Busteed there 
could be no division of opinion between the judges, so the only way U.S. v Hall could go 
to the Supreme Court now was a conviction and an appeal. John P. Southworth remained 
as District Attorney and the defendants had several lawyers, including John Pierce, who 
had witnessed the riot.
1
 The citizens of the town had not forgotten about the trial, either. 
If anything, interest in the case had increased in the eight months since the trial’s 
postponement. In fact, on January 6, 1872, the day the trial began, a man entered the 
court room and demanded that District Attorney Southworth come outside. The man, 
recorded only as Watson, angrily confronted Southworth. The district attorney, who was 
preparing to begin the important case, refused to leave the courtroom, and the man left 
with no other incident.
2
  
The defendants faced the same four charges as before. Again, the first charge was 
that the accused men banded and conspired together either to stop or intimidate the 
Republican speakers on the day of the riot. The prosecution delivered the second charge 
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against the men, again, for conspiring together to intimidate and deprive Charles Hays 
specifically of his right to freedom of speech. The third charge filed against the men 
accused them of banding together to hamper citizens, specifically Republican citizens, 
from their right to peaceably assemble. The fourth and final indictment charged that they 
intended to prevent citizens, again specifically Republicans, from executing their right of 
suffrage.
3
 Southworth wanted to arraign the men immediately, but the court gave the 
defendants a day to discuss the indictments.  
Southworth meticulously framed the indictments. Because both the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Enforcement Act were so new, no precedent had been set for gaining 
convictions under them.  Because the obvious crimes committed, riot, assault, and 
murder, were not considered federal crimes the district attorney faced the difficult job of 
crafting the indictments to charge a federal offense. The federal crime would be one of 
conspiracy and banding together to prevent the Republicans from exercising their rights. 
Regardless of the violence that occurred, the key element was the conspiracy to create 
that violence to impede civil rights. In the indictments Southworth assumed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights and made the Amendment 
applicable to the States. Under this assumption, if the states did not protect blacks’ rights 
the federal government could intervene. Ultimately the attorney general’s indictments 
were experiments in what would stand up in court.    
When the defendants returned to court they hoped to quash the indictments, but 
Judge Woods allowed the first three counts to stand as they were. The Judge took a day to 
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review the fourth count.
4
 When court resumed the next day, Woods quashed the fourth 
count, which said that the men “intimidated certain persons named from exercising the 
right of suffrage.”5 Ultimately Woods did not see the direct connection between the riot 
and preventing citizens from their right to vote. Had the riot occurred on Election Day the 
connection might have been more evident. As the events stood, Woods must have 
considered the link arbitrary. When the charges had been agreed upon by both the 
defense and the prosecution the names of the men were read, and the defense noted that 
Southworth failed to put the names of some of the men on all three indictments. The 
defense attorney wanted to consolidate all indictments and allow a nolle prosequi (to 
drop the charges), arguing that the men Southworth did not list on all three indictments 
should be released.  Judge Woods denied this request, leaving a total of twenty-one men 
indicted.
6
 John J. Jolly, Robert Hamlett, James McBrown, Edward Meredith, William 
Perkins, F.H. Mundy, John Perkins, Beverly Pierce, and Joseph Eliott appeared in the 
court. John Hall Jr., William Pettigrew, Joseph Reynolds, George Bizzle, William 
Widerford, Hugh L. White, Elisha Estis, Charles Spencer, William Harper, William C. 
Hall, Thomas Cowan, and Edwin Reese Jr. did not appear, nor had they been arrested.
7
 
After much stalling, the court selected a trial jury made up of eight white men and 
four African Americans.
8
  This jury was a major development. Previously blacks could 
not even testify against a white person, let alone sit on a jury. These four black jurors 
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risked the angry retribution of white southerners.  Once the jury was selected, the court 
was ready to begin. No opening remarks were recorded and the court moved right to 
witness testimony. The prosecution first called former Governor Parsons and then 
Charles Hays to the stand as witnesses; both men had spoken at the Republican rally on 
the day of the riot. Both witnesses told the jury they heard shots from the courthouse 
windows behind them and that the windows were about six feet off the ground. Neither 
witness specifically identified any of the defendants as parties to the violence.
9
 
The next witness, white Republican Greene County clerk Arthur Smith, reported 
that on October 1, 1870, Republican fliers went up around Eutaw advertising the political 
rally. Democratic fliers did not go up until October 13. Smith also testified that on the 
day of the riot he locked his office door but he opened his window to give General 
Warner water, at which point Edwin Meredith, one of the defendants, climbed into his 
office and unlocked the door to let other Democrats into the room.
10
 In contrast with 
Governor Parsons and Charles Hays, Smith identified Alvin Spencer, William Pettigrew, 
Joseph Reynolds, and Edwin Meredith as men who yelled at William Warner during his 
speech.
11
 Smith believed there were a total of about 200 shots fired during the riot. He 
also testified that afterwards he saw J.J. Jolly and several of the defendants with guns.
12
 
According to Smith, after the initial gunshots Republican representative candidate Sam 
Brown, who later reported the crime to Judge Woods, hid in Smith’s office. John Hall Jr. 
                                                 
9
 Ibid.  
10
 “Trial of the Eutaw Prisoners,” Mobile Daily Register, January 10, 1872. 
11
 Ibid.  
12
 Ibid. 
86 
found him and aimed a gun at Brown while calling to other Democrats. Someone yelled 
to Hall, “John, don’t, for God’s sake, shoot a man in cold blood!”13 
 William Cockrell, a sixteen year old white lad, whose father had been beaten over 
testifying earlier to the grand jury, also testified. The prosecution whisked young 
Cockrell out of the state immediately after his father had been beaten because he was 
such a key witness.
14
 It took an inordinate amount of courage for this young man to 
testify when his own father had been beaten by these very same men for doing the same 
thing. He claimed that he saw a Democrat, Ed Meredith, fire the first shot. He also stated 
that Joseph Elliott, Robert Hamlett, William Harper, Thomas Cowan, Beverly Pierce, 
W.E. Hall and Ed Reese Jr. fired shots. He also saw the sheriff’s deputy Hugh L. White 
fire at a black man who then fell. In retrospect the boy remembered seeing only one black 
man with a gun earlier that morning, but none during the riot.
15
  
Witness George Crenshaw, a black Republican, initially heard Jolly speak at the 
Democratic Rally, but Crenshaw left when the Republican rally began. As he walked 
away, he heard Jolly say, “Go along you…it’s going to rain on your side of the house.”16 
Crenshaw, unlike any of the other witnesses, Republican or Democrat, could name five of 
the injured black men: Clint Hays, James Hays, White Hays, and Tony Thompson, and a 
man only identified as Lee.
17
 It is worth noting that the three men with the surname Hays 
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were, in all likelihood, former slaves of Charles Hays. It was common for freedmen to 
have the last names of their former masters, and as Hays was one of the largest 
landholders in the county, it was possible these men were his former property. It is 
important to acknowledge that Hays never did name any men he knew who were injured, 
when probably he knew at least a few of his former slaves and current laborers who were 
hurt. 
 The defense put a number of Democrats on the stand once the prosecution rested. 
Several witnesses told the jury that J.J. Jolly had, in fact, tried to calm the Democrats 
during the Republican speeches by shouting, “Give him a hearing boys, he’s making a 
very nice Democratic Speech.”18 Samuel Cockrell, another witness for the defense who 
had no known relation to William Cockrell, the prosecution’s witness, claimed that he 
saw defendants and earlier participants, Meredith, Hamlett, Jolly, and Pettigrew, in the 
Clerk’s office during the loudest and most violent part of the riot. He also claimed that 
while the blacks did initially flee after the riot, they came back armed.
19
 Democrat S.M. 
Kirkesy testified that as far as he understood, the Republican meeting was to be held at 
the train depot about a half mile south of the courthouse. He also told the jury that he saw 
six to eight armed black men that morning. Kirkesy also explained that Jolly did 
everything in his power to stop any violence, including going to the grocery stores and 
asking them to close. This would prevent the sale of alcohol, which he understood would 
make the rally even more dangerous. Kirkesy also named a few prominent Democrats he 
saw over on the Republican side of the courthouse, with John Hunnicutt among them.
20
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Hunnicutt had helped to establish the Klan in the area a few years earlier. Kirkesy also 
pointed a finger at Judge William Miller, the Republican judge who had been beaten and 
whose nephew Alexander Boyd had been brutally murdered, claiming that as Kirkesy 
was leaving the rally Miller told him, “the devil would be to play presently, and he was 
going to leave.” 21 When the prosecution cross-examined Kirkesy, they asked if these 
men had a good reason to be armed in town. The defense objected, trying to explain that 
a store had been burned and that being armed was a precautionary measure. The 
prosecution explained that it did not matter why the men would calculate an event simply 
that they did.
22
 The key element in a conspiracy was that these defendants colluded and 
premeditated an act of violence; their motives were irrelevant. The charges were 
ultimately against conspiracy, not the violent outcome of that conspiracy. 
 The next several witnesses for the defense told roughly the same story, with small 
details changed. L.G. Cockrell claimed that Hays ordered the first gunshots by shouting 
“fire;” he was certain J.J. Jolly did not shout the command. He heard someone yell “boys, 
we must protect him,” as soon as Hays fell off the stand. Israel D. Smith claimed that the 
Democrats directed their gunfire in the air because foliage fell off the trees.
23
 Some shots 
may have gone into the trees, and certainly leaves would have fallen, yet the riot occurred 
in late October. In all likelihood the trees were shedding their leaves anyway, and falling 
leaves cannot be used as proof of bullet trajectories. S.W. Dunlap testified that he saw 
defendant Robert Hamlett drunk, so he took him to Jolly and Morgan’s office before the 
                                                 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Ibid.  
23
 Ibid.  
89 
firing even began.
24
 Enoch Morgan corroborated this story.
25
 According to this testimony, 
Hamlett could not have been guilty. Two witnesses admitted that Jo Reynolds fired on a 
black man, but that he stood too far away to have hit the man. The witnesses for the 
defense also explained that during the Republicans’ speeches there was not only negative 
“hooting” but also “cheering” as well. It was not a hostile environment, he claimed, but a 
lively discussion.
26
 Other witnesses focused on the number of blacks in town that day. 
Several witnesses claimed they rarely saw blacks armed, yet they observed 150-200 
armed blacks the morning before the riot. Two witnesses identified a black man, Henry 
Hamlet, as the man who fired the first shots.
27
 In defense of Robert Hamlett who 
allegedly threatened former Governor Parsons, Joseph G. Williford explained to the jury 
that Hamlett did not threaten Parsons, he threatened Williford. Williford testified that 
Hamlett threatened to shoot him over a “personal matter” but the words were not directed 
at Parsons.
28
 
 While the witnesses’ testimony may have seemed mundane, it was important for 
the jury to be able to understand the broader picture of events. Did the Democrats 
purposely start the riot, or was it just an unfortunate accident? Were there tensions 
between Democrats and Republicans in Eutaw? These are things that proved specifically 
relevant when prosecuting defendants under the Enforcement Acts. The prosecution 
attempted to show the nature of the riot itself. Because the crimes of assault, riot and 
murder were not federal crimes, the prosecution had to demonstrate that the defendants 
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conspired together to infringe on the freedmen’s federal rights. That conspiracy was the 
federal crime. 
 In total, the court called thirty-six witnesses. These included ten witnesses for the 
prosecution (including Charles Hays, who had refused to testify earlier) and twenty for 
the defense. The other six were not designated.
29
 Judge Woods excluded any testimony 
on the “private conference” held by the Democratic council before the riot, which put the 
defense at a loss. The defense took time to explain to the jury the difference between an 
admission of guilt and res-gestae. Res-gestae, when applied to the witnesses, was in 
essence the witness repeating words from another individual who might, or might not 
have been admitting guilt, similar to hearsay.
30
  The defense hoped to discredit the 
prosecution’s witnesses. The defense called Arthur Smith, “an adventurer, not belonging 
to a class of men identified with the community, but standing in the position of a hostile 
witness, having no true identity with [this part of] the country.”31 They claimed he lied at 
least eight times in his testimony.
32
 They also explained to the jury that they could not 
assume that “every man who sees [a crime] and does not prevent it is a banded 
conspirator…”33 The defense cast doubt on the prosecution by asking why there were so 
few witnesses. Where were the freedmen? Y.E. Heendon, the defense attorney, asked the 
jury, “Where are the dead? Where are the wounded coming to testify?”34 Heendon also 
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poked holes in Parsons’, Hays’ and Cockrell’s testimonies by pointing out they did not 
name a single defendant by name. In fact, witnesses for the prosecution in general rarely 
named any man by name.
35
 The lack of African American witnesses and the absence of 
specific names in the prosecution’s testimony most likely point to a fear of the 
defendants. Retribution for the testimony had already befallen William Cockrell, Arthur 
Smith, and Charles Hays earlier in the case.  
 The defense attorney argued that the district attorney and the court brought 
suspicion on every action of the defendants: “even the sun rising in the east that morning 
was a matter of suspicion.”36 From there Heendon turned back to the freedmen as well as 
the Carpetbaggers and Scalawags who supposedly controlled them. The defense told the 
jury, “…these poor colored people were deluded into… coming for the purpose of 
intimidating the Democratic meeting.”37 This argument might be the most inane that the 
defense made. African Americans naturally supported the party that freed them, and they 
would not have to be deluded to attend Republican meetings. Moreover African 
Americans were too intelligent to attempt to intimidate a Democratic meeting full of 
town leaders and, almost certainly, Klan leaders. Freedmen might act out violently, as 
they did after the Klan murdered Alexander Boyd, but not with such certain repercussions 
as breaking up a Democratic meeting. 
 In his closing arguments, district attorney Southworth recognized that the trial had 
political repercussions, but regardless of the political stance of the defendants he still 
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needed to prove them guilty of a crime under the Enforcement Act.
38
  Southworth 
explained to the jury that if he had all the names of the men on the Democratic Council 
who called the meeting, he would have indicted every one of them.
39
 Southworth claimed 
that “it was morally a crime to call the democratic meeting at all, as the result could be 
anticipated (and the council, it will be seen, did anticipate it) from the condition of the 
public mind; and he has a right to suppose that the men who managed it were the men 
who called it.”40 Southworth explained to the jury that the defense’s attempt to pinpoint 
who fired the first shot became a moot point entirely. As Southworth explained, “Judge 
Miller knew nothing of the firing, but he had testified to the ‘attempt to hinder the 
exercise of the right of speech;’ after that it is unnecessary to show who fired—the 
offence was complete before Maj. Hays was touched, and it was unnecessary that the 
meeting should be broken up.”41 The Mobile Daily Register, the notoriously Democratic 
newspaper, cut short the District Attorney’s statement claiming the paper did not have 
room for the entire speech.
42
 This statement may be true, but the paper had devoted an 
entire issue to the trial.  It is probable that the Democratic paper simply did not agree with 
the District Attorney and therefore refused to print his statement as an act of defiance.  
 Once both sides rested, Judge Woods addressed the jury. He began his 
instructions by saying, “This gentlemen, has been called a political prosecution. I think 
this is a mistake. The offense charged is not a political offense, as that term is generally 
and properly understood. This is simply a prosecution against the accused for an alleged 
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violation of the constitutional rights of private citizens, and whether the cause is a 
political one or not, it is governed by the same rules of law, and your sworn duty is the 
same as in other cases.” 43 He explained to the jury that they had a duty to consider the 
crimes of each individual man separately.
44
 The guilt of one man did not prove the guilt 
of the others. He also explained that a key component of the trial was to determine if the 
defendants banded and conspired together to “hinder and prevent [the speakers] free 
exercise and enjoyment of the right of freedom of speech” and to peaceably assemble.45  
Woods argued that the prosecution must also show that two or more of the men 
conspired together; the conspiracy must involve at least two individuals. As Woods 
explained,  
Though the common design is the essence of the charge, it is not necessary to 
prove that the defendants came together and actually agreed in terms to have that 
design and to pursue it by common means. If it be proved that the defendants 
pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing 
one part, and another part of the same, so as to complete it with a view to the 
attainment of the same object, the jury will be justified in the conclusion that they 
were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.
46
  
 
Woods probably did not allow testimony of what occurred during the meeting of 
the Democratic Council, because, in essence, it did not matter if a conspiracy had been 
planned in an official manner beforehand. The conspiracy itself could be a spontaneous 
event with no planning. What mattered was that a conspiracy did exist by the actions of 
the Democratic Council. Woods went on to describe to the jury what a guilty verdict 
required, stating that “The intent must be either to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate a 
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citizen of the United States with the purpose of preventing or hindering his free exercise 
and enjoyment of any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution of 
the United States.”47  
In addition to determining if a conspiracy existed, and if within that conspiracy 
the defendants hindered the rights given to the speakers by the Constitution, Woods also 
required that the jury decide which side fired the first shot. If it came from the black 
Republicans and only one man fired, that does not make the whole assembly of blacks 
violent. Therefore, the defendants could not claim to be acting in self-defense against a 
violent group.
48
 Woods addressed the accusation that the blacks at the riot were armed by 
saying that “In Alabama, the carrying of concealed weapons is prohibited by statute. But 
if a man carries his weapon in full view, whether gun or pistol, and does so with lawful 
purpose, his right to do so is as clear as his right to carry a watch or wear a chain.”49 
Woods devoted more of his attention to the Eutaw Riot case than simply hearing 
the testimony in court. He knew that the case had the potential to set a major legal 
precedent under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act. Because of the 
breadth of the case he wrote to Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley in December 
1870. Woods wanted to be clear whether the new Enforcement Act applied to the riot 
case.
50
 Bradley was not unfamiliar with the South and its social collapse after the Civil 
War. On a trip through the South in 1867 Bradley experienced firsthand the agitation and 
fear southerners felt toward the North and their growing tension with the newly freed 
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blacks over the distribution of labor. Bradley wrote to his daughter, “The people here, say 
that the Freedman’s Bureau is our engine of mischief; that it teaches the negroes to be 
discontented, gives them false notions; and utterly incapacitates them from labor.”51 He 
realized that the tensions between blacks and whites, as well as those between 
Republicans and Democrats, ran deeper than simply a lost war. He described southerners 
to his daughter, writing that “They look upon themselves as a conquered people and I fear 
will have to suffer still more before they will give up their cherished notions of a great 
Southern Confederacy.”52 
When Woods wrote to Bradley asking about the Eutaw Riot, Bradley wrote back 
to Woods calling the firing itself “a private municipal offense” and that the federal issue 
was the motivation for the firing into a crowd.
53
 Bradley did not intend that the municipal 
crime should go unpunished, nor did he mean to diminish the severity of the firing. In the 
eyes of the law, though, the action did not hold as much importance as the motivation 
behind the action. The defendants could be motivated for any number of reasons that 
could be legally prosecuted. Historian Lou Falkner Williams describes the complication 
behind the motives of Klan attacks, writing that “…contempt for the black man… and 
desire to suppress the Republican state government were so inextricably intertwined that 
it is impossible to separate them.”54 Both the Democrats and the Klan, who can likely be 
interchangeable in the Eutaw Riot case, had many reasons for wanting to start the riot. 
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Yet, to be charged under the Enforcement Act, it was not the action alone, but the fact 
that they premeditated the action as a conspiracy to deny rights of U.S. citizens. 
Bradley’s letter to Woods also explicitly stated that the Fourteenth Amendment does in 
fact incorporate the Bill of Rights. He wrote, “Now, the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States here referred to, are undoubtedly those which may be 
denominated fundamental; and among those I suppose we are safe in including those 
which, in the Constitution are expressly secured to the people, either as against the action 
of the Federal Government or the State Governments.”55 Bradley continued in his letter to 
Woods, “Viewed simply as a riot, it was an offense against the municipal law only; but 
viewed as a riot to intimidate persons and prevent them from exercising the right of 
suffrage, guaranteed to them by the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution; it was a 
violation of that.”56 Focusing on the fourth charge against the Democratic rioters, that of 
depriving citizens of their right of suffrage, Bradley wrote, “It is alleged that their savage 
and dastardly act was the result of a conspiracy to intimidate the persons attending the 
meeting from voting at the coming election, it seems to me that it was a violation of the 
foregoing act, and punishable as felony...”57 Bradley’s emphasis on the Fifteenth 
Amendment was not unusual. As the last Amendment ratified before the Enforcement 
Act, it was the most relevant in the mind of the judge. 
The courts needed to interpret the Fifteenth Amendment in addition to the other 
legislation. As historian Xi Wang points out, both the North and the South had their own 
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versions of paternalism.
58
 Southerners believed it benefited blacks if whites controlled 
blacks’ actions and labor. Meanwhile in the North, many whites felt a responsibility to 
help give opportunities to blacks, but after the rights of citizenship had been granted to 
the freedmen all Republican responsibility ended.  The Republicans wanted the 
government to intervene enough to pass an amendment but from that point the control 
went to the states. Republicans, according to Wang honestly believed that the Fifteenth 
Amendment ended all ramifications of slavery and granted true “freedom.”59 Wang 
explains, “Many Republican leaders shared the popular feeling that the Fifteenth 
Amendment settled the issue of black men’s voting rights and signaled the end of the 
party’s antislavery mission.” 60 Since southerners continued to oppress the freedmen after 
the Fifteenth Amendment passed, Republicans soon realized their mission had to 
continue. Wang writes, “Finally, they saw that the Republican state governments in the 
South alone could not stop the Klan terror or the rapid development of black 
disfranchisement by force and that the federal government was obliged to intervene.”61 
The Enforcement Acts were the resulting intervention.  
 Bradley’s letters are important because he emphasized the new Reconstruction 
Amendments and the conspiracy of the rioters. Bradley recognized that the Amendments 
and the conspiracy were significant, because under the Enforcement Act not only were 
the actions themselves punishable, but also if the defendants preplanned those actions 
then that became a key element in prosecuting the crimes as conspiracy. Bradley may 
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have understood the crime itself as a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, but he used 
the Enforcement Act to enforce that Amendment. The Enforcement Act was only 
considered valid through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet the connection had 
yet to be legitimized by the Supreme Court. Federal courts throughout the country faced 
the issue of interpreting the Amendments and legitimizing the new Enforcement Acts.  
This path began with the Bill of Rights. The Constitution guaranteed the rights 
granted to all citizens of the United States. The Bill of Rights expressly stated these 
rights; but until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights applied 
only to the federal government. With the introduction of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
its privileges and immunities clause, the federal courts struggled to define what the term 
“privileges and immunities” consisted of and whether those privileges and immunities 
were included in the Bill of Rights, and if they now applied to the states as well as the 
federal government. The issue of privileges and immunities is a longstanding battle in 
United States Constitutional history. As historian Raoul Berger wrote, “Because the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment is probably the largest source of the Courts business and 
furnishes the chief fulcrum for its control of Controversial policies, the question whether 
such control is authorized by the Constitution is of great practical importance.”62 The 
framers created both the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the 
rights of citizens.  
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Woods turned to Bradley for advice on how the Fourteenth Amendment applied 
to the Eutaw rioters’ case. What exactly were privileges and immunities and how did they 
apply to this particular instance? Bradley explained to Woods: 
…Congress has a right, by appropriate legislation, to enforce and protect such 
fundamental rights, against unfriendly or insufficient State legislation. I say 
unfriendly or insufficient: for the XIVth Amendment not only prohibits the 
making or enforcing of laws which shall abridge the privileges of the citizen, but 
prohibits the States from denying to all persons within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. Denying includes inaction as well as action. And denying 
the equal protection of the laws includes the omission to protect as well as the 
omission to pass laws for protection.
63
  
 
Bradley’s focus on privileges and immunities comes early in the legal battle over 
the terms. To protect privileges and immunities the courts need to be able to define them 
precisely. In coming to this conclusion Bradley referenced Corfield v. Coryell, (1823), a 
Supreme Court case that had earlier defined privileges and immunities. In the case Justice 
Bushrod Washington addressed the privileges and immunities clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington wrote, 
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities which are, in their nature fundamental; which belong, of right, to 
the citizens of all free governments, and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by 
the citizens of the several states which compose this union, from the time of their 
becoming free, independent, and sovereign…protection by the government, the 
enjoyment of life and liberty; with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to 
such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole.
64
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  In the case of the Eutaw Riot those privileges and immunities that Democrats 
violated were the fundamental First Amendment protections of freedom of speech and the 
right to assemble. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, those rights applied only to the 
federal government. Though the Fourteenth Amendment expressly forbids states to 
infringe on the rights of citizens, now the issue was whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
applied the Bill of Rights to the States. If so, then states are not only forbidden from 
impairing the rights of citizens, but can be held equally at fault if it does nothing to 
punish individuals from infringing upon those same rights. If the state therefore fails to 
pursue its duty of defending the rights of citizens, the federal government could step in.  
Because many states, including Alabama, refused to enforce the Constitution and protect 
the rights of their citizens, the duty fell to the United States Congress. This specifically 
applied to the state of Alabama as it had taken no action against the Eutaw rioters.
65
 To 
give the federal government the ability to act, Congress enacted the First Enforcement 
Act. With its creation, the First Enforcement Act provided another piece of legislation to 
protect citizens’ rights and added another layer of complication to the legal doctrine. 
Congress created the First Enforcement Act (1870) after the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the 
right to enforce the Amendment with “appropriate legislation,” which Congress 
attempted to do with the Enforcement Act. These acts were unprecedented; this was the 
first time the federal government attempted to protect the rights of citizens on a national 
scale.
66
 According to Wang, “the framers clearly expected the [Enforcement] bill to be as 
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comprehensive as possible to stop the rampant Ku Klux Klan, to protect the political 
rights of blacks, and to defeat Democratic attempts to regain political power in the 
South.” 67 Yet Democrats in the South argued the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
privileges and immunities clause did not encompass the Bill of Rights, and therefore the 
Enforcement Act was not intended to enforce those rights. Democrats challenged the 
constitutionality of the Enforcement Act on the national front in the later South Carolina 
Klan Trials.
68
 
The South Carolina Klan Trials came at the heels of United States v Hall as a 
large scale test of the Enforcement Act. During the interim of the two Hall trials– the first 
being delayed because of a lack of witnesses – the Justice Department attempted to 
prosecute over 200 Klansmen in South Carolina under the Enforcement Act. As Lou 
Falkner Williams explained, the federal government took the stance that “The Fourteenth 
Amendment… had radically altered the nature of the federal system. Through the 
‘privileges and immunities’ clause, the first eight amendments became federally 
enforceable rights. If a state did not protect its citizens in the exercise of those rights, the 
federal government could place itself squarely between the citizens and the state.”69 The 
federal government in South Carolina convicted many Klansmen and also sent a division 
of opinion on the Fourteenth Amendment and Bill of Rights to the Supreme Court, which 
the Supremes had not ruled on before the second Hall trial in Alabama.  
 Southworth’s job as the federal prosecuting attorney in Alabama was to frame 
indictments that would not only stand up in court but also demonstrate the new national 
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authority embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment. He prosecuted on the understanding 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause incorporated the Bill 
of Rights making those individual rights applicable to the states as well as the federal 
government. The idea was that the national courts could enforce these individual rights 
against individual action– under the recently passed Enforcement Acts – as well as 
against state action. Southworth, Woods, and Bradley recognized that if the jury found 
the rioters guilty under the Enforcement Act, the defendants would appeal to the Supreme 
Court. The appeal would provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to rule on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court would have a broad, national precedent to work 
with.
70
 Woods agreed with Bradley and followed Bradley’s advice on the matter.  Woods 
expressed his nationalistic views early in the case, when the defendants filed a pre-trial 
demurrer, arguing that the charges were not constitutional. His response to the demurrer 
was the only record of his views on the legal issues involved; it echoes Bradley, taking a 
broad view of the Constitution.  
Woods’ opinion on the demurer could have changed the structure of the American 
democracy. This was the first time a federal judge on record applied the Bill of Rights to 
all citizens of the United States. Wood’s opinion is the crux of United States v Hall and 
the heart of the broad nationalistic interpretation of the Constitution for which the federal 
government was fighting. Woods began with a summary of the argument saying, “A 
demurrer is filed to this indictment based on the following grounds; (1) That the matters 
charged in said counts are not in violation of any rights or privilege granted or secured by 
the constitution of the United States. (2) That they are not in violation of any provision of 
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the act of congress, on which the indictment is based, or of any statute of the United 
States. (3) That each of said counts charges the commission of several and distinct 
offenses.”71 The demurrer claimed that the charges filed against the defendants were not 
constitutional; while the right to peaceably assemble and the right of free speech are 
protected by the Constitution, it is simply written that the federal government “recognizes 
the existence of these rights it does not secure them.”72 Defense counsel argued that the 
federal government cannot impair these rights, but nothing is written about the states or 
individuals. 
Woods’ opinion addressed the point of citizens’ rights. Woods ruled that the 
intention of the Bill of Rights was to grant the rights to the people of the United States. 
As Woods argued, “For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power 
to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be 
restrained when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed.”73 Woods 
continued his argument by laying responsibility at the feet of the state government as 
well, saying, “It is claimed that when congress is prohibited from interfering with a right 
by legislation, that does not authorize congress to protect that right by legislation; that as 
the states are not prohibited by the constitution from interference with the rights under 
consideration, congress, although prohibited itself from impairing these rights, has no 
grant of power to interfere for their protection as against the states.”74 Woods’ argument 
was that the law protected the rights of citizens on both the federal level and the state 
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level. Woods believed that although rights were not supposed to be violated by Congress 
or the state, it was implied that they should be secured.
75
 He rejected the first two points 
of the demurrer, because he claimed the right to free speech and the right to peaceably 
assemble are secured by the Constitution of the United States. The charges held against 
the defendants were a direct result of a violation of those rights. Woods summed up his 
point by writing that “all rights which are protected against either a national or state 
legislation may fairly be said to be secured rights.”76 
Woods’ opinion went on to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
privileges and immunities clause changed the very nature of federalism. He defined the 
origins of specific rights of citizens by saying that “We find that congress is forbidden to 
impair them by the first amendment, and the States are forbidden to impair them by the 
fourteenth amendment. Can they not, then, be said to be completely secured?”77 Woods 
believed the privileges and immunities clause in the Fourteenth Amendment referred to 
the fundamental rights of citizens protected by the Bill of Rights. He emphasized the 
legitimacy of the Enforcement Act by writing that “It would be unseemly for congress to 
interfere directly with state enactments, and as it cannot compel the activity of state 
officials, the only appropriate legislation it can make is that which will operate directly 
on offenders and offenses, and protect the rights which the amendment secures.”78 The 
rights to which Wood refers were not fully defined by the courts at this point and in fact 
Wang writes, Woods “actually helped to spell out the substance of the phrase ‘any right,’ 
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which had appeared in section six of the enforcement act but had never been fully 
explained by the congressional Republicans who debated it. Unfortunately however, the 
Supreme Court would soon negate Woods’ interpretation in the Slaughterhouse 
opinion.”79 Wood’s opinion was extremely radical: in addition to defining the rights 
referred to in the Enforcement Act, Woods recognized the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
reversal of the nature of citizenship.  Originally citizenship depended on the state, but 
with the Fourteenth Amendment national citizenship became paramount and state 
citizenship depended on national.
80
 This was a major turning point in American national 
identity. 
The Eutaw rioters prevented Republican speakers from addressing a crowd, and 
black Republican citizens from assembling to watch those speakers. The rights of speech 
and assembly are specifically granted by the Bill of Rights in the United States 
Constitution, and Woods interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to extend those rights to 
black citizens against both state and individual interference. The Fourteenth Amendment 
also provided Congress with the authority to enact further appropriate legislation to 
protect those rights of citizens; this legislation took form in the Enforcement Act. Woods’ 
opinion made a direct link between the Reconstruction legislation and the United States 
Constitution. 
The federal district attorney, John Southworth, had spent two years working on 
the Hall case. He fought to subpoena witnesses, and he moved witnesses out of the state 
for protection. He spent countless hours framing indictments to secure a guilty verdict 
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under the Enforcement Act and secure a nationalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. With all these tasks behind him, he summed up the efforts in a concluding 
argument that took a total of two hours and forty minutes. Judge Woods spent an 
additional thirty-one minutes addressing the jury. With the new Reconstruction 
legislation being hotly debated in newspapers across the country, Judge Woods knew that 
the trial of the Eutaw rioters was a topic of debate. He also recognized that the jurors held 
in their power an important legal doctrine that could affect the law’s impact on the entire 
country. After he instructed the jury, relayed their duty to them, and explained the 
specifics of the case, he sent them to deliberate: “Take the case to your retirement, 
investigate it with most anxious care, giving to the defendants and to the United States 
the benefit of the rules of law as I have explained them for your guidance, and sensible of 
your great responsibility, render such verdict as will meet with the approval of your own 
consciences, and justify you before the Judge of all the Earth.”81  
The jury took a total of only sixty-nine minutes to come to a decision.
82
 As the 
defendants took their seats and the judge took the bench, the court realized that Joe Elliot, 
one of the defendants, was absent. It took about fifteen minutes to track him down before 
the jury could render their verdict. As the Mobile Daily Register reported that day, “The 
court room was well filled during the progress of the argument by an attentive audience, a 
considerable proportion of which was composed of ladies, who entered during the 
opening speech, and most of whom returned after the recess at the conclusion of the 
speeches by the counsel for the defense.”83 With the courtroom packed and all the 
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defendants present, the jury announced its verdict: “We the jury find the defendants NOT 
GUILTY.”84 With that verdict went the opportunity for the Eutaw Riot case to legitimize 
the Enforcement Act and provide a broad, national interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The case could not be appealed with no guilty verdict and thus it would not 
be heard by the Supreme Court. Therefore the Enforcement Act failed to keep 
southerners from violating blacks’ rights. Unfortunately, had the case not been postponed 
and District Judge Busteed had sat on the bench with Woods, the two judges could have 
divided on the issue and automatically sent the case to the Supreme Court, regardless of 
the outcome of the jury. A division of opinion would have given the Supreme Court an 
earlier opportunity to rule on the Fourteenth Amendment and Enforcement Acts with a 
strong precedent from the lower court. 
Some citizens of Eutaw rejoiced at the news. Less than a week after the jury 
delivered the verdict, a letter to the editor appeared in the Mobile Daily Register. The 
letter ranted about the legitimacy of the Enforcement Act, saying, “The very law under 
which they were tried was a fraud and a false hood, because it put the accused on trial for 
an imaginary offence—in other words, for one offence; a political offence; against the 
United States Government—when, in truth, they had only been guilty of a breach of the 
peace, common to all political meeting and elections, which was a State offence, 
cognizable by the State courts, and not within the jurisdiction of the United States 
courts.”85  The author goes on to complain about all attempted trials under the 
Enforcement Act, including the South Carolina Klan trials. He wrote, “In Alabama 
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prisoners are arraigned to be tried: in South Carolina they are arraigned to be 
convicted.”86  The sheer number of Klansmen convictions in South Carolina upset many 
Democrats throughout the South.  U.S. v. Hall’s not guilty verdict was a relief to a 
majority of Southern Democrats who saw the acquittals in the Eutaw Riot case as a 
triumph over the Northern Republicans. It was a major disappointment to Republicans 
who had hoped to have the broad national interpretation of the Constitution legitimized 
by the federal courts. 
A month after the trial, Republicans and government officials began to question 
the trial. The Justice Department questioned why the jury in the Eutaw Riot case did not 
take the test oath. The Justice Department investigated District Attorney Southworth to 
see if he in some way allowed the jury to be tampered with. The problem was that if 
anyone tampered with the jury in any way, the jurors could not have given a fair 
judgment. District Attorney Southworth asked Judge Woods to verify the accuracy of the 
trial. Woods vouched for Southworth’s dedication and persistence in the case.87 He also 
supported the jury’s not guilty verdict by stating that “in my judgment the jury empaneled 
was a jury of good and lawful men a fair and impartial jury and were disposed to do their 
duty according to their oaths.” He went on to write that “They gave the case of the Eutaw 
rioters the most careful attention and in my opinion their verdict was justified by the 
evidence in its case.”88 This comment could possibly show that Woods’ opinion on the 
case had changed.  So close to the end of the trial it seems more likely that Woods simply 
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saw no wrongdoing on the part of the jury. A jury is required to find guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt; if they maintained any question in their minds they could not within the 
confines of the law convict the defendants. Woods simply defended the district attorney 
and the court’s selection of jury members. 
The Eutaw Riot case joined with many other Enforcement Act cases across the 
South. Prosecutions of the cases began fervently but soon died down because of the 
overload of the cases within the Justice Department. Prosecution in Alabama was 
generally unsuccessful. The same year the Eutaw Riot case occurred, the Justice 
Department terminated seven other criminal prosecutions in the Southern District of 
Alabama.
89
 Only one of the cases that year resulted in an acquittal, that of the Eutaw 
rioters.  Six cases under the Enforcement Act were nolled, discontinued, or quashed, and 
seven cases were still pending in 1873.
90
 But as Robert Kaczorowski points out, things 
got worse: “During the spring and summer of 1873 the Justice Department completely 
abandoned civil rights enforcement. Instead of actually prosecuting violators of the 
Enforcement Acts, the government merely threatened prosecution, hoping this would 
deter the Ku Klux from resuming its terror.” 91 A small window of time had appeared in 
which the Justice Department could legitimize the new Enforcement Act at the federal 
level, and with the failure of the court in the Eutaw rioter’s case, the window closed. The 
initial Fourteenth Amendment battle in the Supreme Court would be over the Fourteenth 
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Amendment and its privileges and immunities clause as it applied to white butchers 
rather than to the former slaves. 
Until 1873 the Supreme Court had avoided ruling on the Fourteenth Amendment. 
One case from South Carolina Klan trials was sent to the Supreme Court on a division of 
opinion by the two judges, but the Supreme Court refused to hear the case on a legal 
technicality, preferring to hear the Slaughterhouse cases instead.
92
 A year after the Eutaw 
Riot trial concluded, the Slaughterhouse cases came to the docket of the Supreme Court. 
The case involved a monopoly of the State of Louisiana over the butchers in New 
Orleans. The butchers of New Orleans sued, because the city’s slaughterhouses had been 
moved to a state-controlled area. The butchers believed that the state monopoly violated 
their fundamental right of occupation, to earn an honest living, and these rights should 
have been protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. Both Judge Woods and Justice 
Bradley, whom Woods consulted in the Eutaw riot case, heard the Slaughterhouse cases 
in the lower level federal court. Woods and Bradley believed that the monopoly did 
violate the butchers’ fundamental right to earn a living.  
When the case advanced to the Supreme Court, the majority did not agree with 
Bradley or Woods.  The Supreme Court voted five-four against the butchers.
93
  Supreme 
Court Justice Samuel Freeman Miller gave the Court’s decision, explaining that the 
privileges and immunities referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment are granted by the 
state, not the federal government. Miller ruled that “the entire domain of the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the States, as above defined, lay within the Constitutional 
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and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government.”94 The 
Court went on to say that the framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment specifically 
for the former slaves, writing of the Reconstruction Amendments that “no one can fail to 
be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of 
each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the 
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the 
protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had 
formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”95 The Court feared giving the federal 
government too much power. As Miller explained, the “consequences are so serious, so 
far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our 
institutions: when the effect is to fetter and degrade the state governments by subjecting 
them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally 
conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character…”96 Because the 
Supreme Court refused to recognize the change in relationship between federal and state 
governments inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment would soon be 
used to block the rights of black Americans, an “unintended consequence,” according to 
historian Richard L. Aynes, of the Slaughterhouse cases.
97
  
Justice Bradley wrote one of the dissenting opinions in the Slaughterhouse cases. 
According to Bradley, “The fourteenth amendment, in my judgment, makes it essential to 
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the validity of the legislation of every state that this equality of right should be 
respected.” 98 Bradley argued for basic equal rights for all citizens on the grounds that the 
Fourteenth Amendment automatically incorporates the Bill of Rights and therefore the 
Amendment protects those rights granted by the Constitution and applies them to all 
citizens. He instructed the Court, “If this inhibition has no reference to privileges and 
immunities of this character, but only refers, as held by [the majority] to such privileges 
and immunities as were before its adoption specifically designated in the Constitution or 
necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle 
enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited congress and the 
people on its passage.”99 Bradley’s dissent makes an excellent argument for the necessity 
of the Fourteenth Amendment; if it did not grant equal rights then why was the 
Amendment necessary?  Williams explains the reasoning of the Court and the advantage 
of hearing the Slaughterhouse cases to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment initially, as 
opposed to some other more violent and racially motivated cases within the court system, 
such as the South Carolina Klan cases; “Choosing a case about white butchers instead of 
black freedmen effectively depoliticized the explosive legal questions involved in civil 
rights enforcement and enabled the High Court to decide some of the controversial issues 
without hearing the Klan cases at all.”100 It was U.S. v. Cruikshank that finally settled the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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A year after the Slaughterhouse decisions Justice Bradley and Justice Woods 
heard the case that would define the Fourteenth Amendment. Still a member of the circuit 
court Woods sat jointly with Supreme Court Justice Bradley on a case from Louisiana. 
The case involved the Colfax Massacre, in which a group of about 165 whites killed close 
to 100 Republican freedmen while the latter were defending a public office building. The 
violence began when the governor of Louisiana appointed offices to several Democrats 
and then before making any of the appointments official, gave the offices to Republicans 
instead. Both parties refused to recognize the other and a fight began over who would 
control the courthouse. On Easter Sunday, 1873, a standoff began with mostly black 
Republicans defending the courthouse and white Democrats laying siege to it. The white 
Democrats eventually set fire to the courthouse and fired on any blacks who ran out. The 
Democrats then took prisoners and marched them two by two into the woods and shot 
them in cold blood. The federal government struggled to make arrests, but only nine of 
the approximately 165 white men who took part in the massacre were arrested and 
charged.
101
   
The federal government was able to gain a conviction for three white defendants 
in the lower level courts under the Enforcement Act. The language Woods used in 
addressing the jury and the wording of his ruling in U.S. v Cruikshank (1876) resonated 
back to U.S. v Hall. The essential elements of the two cases seemed similar, with charges 
against the men being that they violated the group’s right to assemble and right to bear 
arms, but the actual events of the Colfax Massacre far eclipsed the violence in Eutaw. 
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While Woods’ opinions remained the same, Justice Bradley seemed to retreat from his 
earlier position.
102
  Sitting with Justice Woods created the opportunity to send the case to 
the Supreme Court on a division of opinion, which is exactly what Bradley did. Unlike 
his letters to Woods regarding the Hall case, Bradley’s Cruikshank opinion eviscerated 
the indictments in the case. He stripped meaning from all the charges claiming the district 
attorney failed to write in the indictments the cause of the riot being race related.  Though 
it was implied, it was not written absolutely. Therefore, the charges could not stand. As 
historian Charles Lane wrote, “Bradley seemed fed up with the Negro.”103 Bradley later 
wrote, “When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation 
has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the 
progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen and ceases to be the 
special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected 
in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.”104 It is possible that 
Bradley felt bound by the Court’s precedents set in the Slaughterhouse cases. He may not 
have wanted to fight a battle which had already been decided by the Court. Woods 
respectfully disagreed with Justice Bradley’s opinion, however, and the case went to the 
Supreme Court.  
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it ruled to overturn the three 
convictions of the lower court. The Court then overruled Woods’ original interpretation 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Robert Kaczorowski observed, “extending the 
reasoning of the Slaugher-House decision to crimes of racial violence, the Court in 
United States v. Cruikshank held that Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment was limited to violations of individuals’ constitutional rights attributable to 
the actions of the States.”105 The Court ruled that the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment initially created it with the actions of the states in mind. The majority 
believed the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect citizens from the actions of other 
citizens, only from the actions of the states. In addition, the Court also decided that the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply the Bill of Rights, specifically the Second 
Amendment, to the states. Congress could not infringe on the rights of citizens to bear 
arms, but it was not required to protect those rights either.  
Speaking for the Cruikshank majority, the newly appointed Chief Justice, 
Morrison Waite, wrote that “The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see 
that the States do not deny the right.”106 The Court snuffed out the privileges and 
immunities clause, and the argument that it included the Bill of Rights, stating that “This 
right was not created by the amendment, neither was its continuance guaranteed, except 
as against congressional interference. For their protection in its enjoyment, therefore, the 
People must look to the States. The power for that purpose was originally placed there, 
and it has never been surrendered to the United States.”107 In order to discredit the 
Fourteenth Amendment the Court defined citizenship in the United States. The Court 
objected to an all-encompassing citizenship of statesmen and countrymen in favor of a 
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mutually-inclusive definition of citizenship. Citizens could be both a citizen of a state and 
a citizen of the United States, one does not fall under the umbrella of the other. The Court 
explained, “We have in our political system a government of the United States and a 
government of each of the several states. Each one of these governments is distinct from 
the others, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, 
within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen 
of the United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of 
these governments will be different from those he has under the other.”108 
The true meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and citizens’ rights both suffered 
because the Court determined in Cruikshank that the Amendment only applied in race 
related situations, and it only applied to state action. Moreover, the High Court ruled that 
the prosecution must prove racial motivation in cases involving black rights—an 
extremely difficult thing to do.  The federal government effectively left blacks with 
nowhere to turn for justice. Cruikshank ruled definitively that the Fourteenth Amendment 
did not apply the Bill of Rights to the states. The Court put the protection of rights at the 
state level. But the complete inaction of the states to protect the rights of blacks gave 
freedmen no relief. Where could they turn when both the federal government and the 
state government refused to help?  Kaczorowski sums up the Court’s decision by saying, 
“To a significant degree, the protection of white citizens’ rights under the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments became casualties to the Supreme Courts’ recognition of the 
primacy of State authority over citizenship and limitation of these amendments to racial 
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discrimination.”109  One final case would prove that the major advocates of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its far reaching interpretation of rights of citizens fell under 
the pressure of the country. 
By 1883 Justice William B. Woods had been appointed to the Supreme Court. 
President Grant appointed him to the bench on December 15, 1880.
110
 Close to a decade 
after he heard the trial of the Eutaw rioters he heard yet another case on the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but this time he was a judge in the highest court in the country along with 
Justice Bradley. In United States v. Harris (1883) the United States sued a sheriff who 
led an armed group into a jail and took the prisoners out of jail, killing one in the process. 
The group was tried under the Enforcement Act. This time the Supreme Court declared 
the act unconstitutional, claiming once again that the Fourteenth Amendment applied 
only to state action, and therefore the government could not prosecute under the 
Enforcement Act.  For this case Judge Woods wrote the majority opinion, stating that “It 
was never supposed that the section under consideration conferred on Congress the power 
to enact a law which would punish a private citizen for an invasion of the rights of his 
fellow citizen, conferred by the State of which they were both residents, on all its citizens 
alike.”111 With this ruling Justice Woods completely reversed his previous decisions in 
Cruikshank, Slaughterhouse, and the Eutaw Riot cases. It is unclear why Justice Woods 
changed his mind; he may have felt bound by precedent.  The Court had already 
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dismissed his opinion in Hall, Cruikshank, and Slaughterhouse. He may have given up 
the fight. 
Judge Woods was initially an advocate for the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
coverage of the Bill of Rights.  A little over a decade later he had completely changed his 
mind. His change of heart mirrors the nation’s path through Reconstruction. With the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act, the United States had the opportunity 
to legally punish the Klan and Democrats who purposely kept the Freedmen from 
exercising their rights. The Eutaw Riot and the corresponding court case would have 
given the Supreme Court an opportunity to define the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
legitimate nationalistic way that would have improved the South and protected the former 
slaves. The Eutaw Riot case, U.S. v. Hall, did not move up to the higher court, but had 
the Court heard the case there was no guarantee that the same results would not have 
occurred.  The legal history of Reconstruction was one of missed opportunities.  
The larger picture of Reconstruction in the South was represented in microcosm 
in the small Alabama town of Eutaw in Greene County. The Eutaw Riot case could have 
been a major turning point in Reconstruction; the Supreme Court following Judge 
Woods’ nationalist example, could have created a broad nationalistic interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Enforcement Act, thus giving blacks protection of the 
rights granted in the Bill of Rights. Instead black citizens had to wait almost a century for 
rights seemingly granted to them in the Constitution. U.S. v Hall stands out from the 
hundreds of cases heard during Reconstruction as an example of a great “what might 
have been.” 
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Conclusion-Missed Opportunity  
Reconstruction presented the entire country with major challenges. The South attempted 
to learn how to live under new laws, which many whites believed were unconstitutional. The 
state governments struggled to maintain the pre-war status quo. The federal government faced 
many obstacles while trying to create legislation to protect the rights of the newly freed slaves. 
And the courts on both the state and federal level endeavored to define and work within the new 
legislation. Unfortunately, while many civil rights offenses were brought to justice under the 
newly ratified Amendments and the Enforcement Act of 1870, the courts missed several primary 
opportunities to legitimize the new legislation and properly protect the freedman of the United 
States. United States v. Hall was one such opportunity. 
Congress began the twelve year period of Reconstruction by ratifying the Thirteenth 
Amendment, the first of the Reconstruction Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment did not do 
enough to protect the former slaves from white southerners. It granted them their freedom but it 
did not protect their rights. White southerners created elaborate “black codes” in the South to 
prevent the freedmen from taking part in fair labor practices, or voting. To aid blacks Congress 
enacted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. With each Amendment the Congress hoped 
the battle over freedmen’s rights would end. Southerners continued to ignore the amendments, 
and the Congress needed specific authority to enforce the federal laws. The creation of the 
Enforcement Act granted Congress the national power to bring white southerners who ignored 
the Reconstruction Amendments to justice. And, yet again, southerners ignored the laws, 
proclaiming the Enforcement Act unconstitutional. Eutaw, Alabama provides the perfect 
microcosm in which to view southerners’ responses to Reconstruction. 
 
120 
Eutaw was a hub for violent Klan activity, yet most Klansmen went unpunished. In one 
instance several men, later known as the “Eutaw Prisoners,” blatantly assaulted a Republican, 
Joseph Hill, on a public street in broad daylight in March 1868, and were arraigned and tried in a 
military tribunal. Democrats argued the military had no jurisdiction, but General George Meade, 
the head of the Fifth Military District, insisted the crime was a political one. The men were 
convicted and sent to hard labor at the Dry Tortugas, but less than two weeks later Meade 
reversed his decision and the men were brought back to Eutaw with much fanfare. The public 
outcry had pressured Meade to change his mind. He warned his district that he would not be 
lenient a second time, but the celebrity of the convicted men and the public’s confidence in their 
social power created an environment of citizen control, not military control.  Military control of 
the South was ineffective, because the public’s popular outcry trumped military justice. 
Southerners never respected the military and Meade’s annulment of the conviction became a 
perfect example of the social power of citizens over the military.
1
 While the Eutaw Prisoners 
may have been punished initially they were soon free to continue to abuse freedmen and white 
Republicans throughout the town of Eutaw and Greene County.  
Within two years of the Eutaw Prisoners’ trial, the Klan committed the brutal murder of 
Alexander Boyd, the county solicitor, and again went unpunished. In May 1870, the Ku Klux 
Klan rode into Eutaw and killed Boyd, a state official who was attempting to find the murderers 
of three black men. The Klan then calmly rode out of town, leaving several people as witnesses. 
Yet even with eye witnesses, including the sheriff, no one formed a posse or made any attempt to 
pursue the criminals. The Governor insisted that a grand jury be formed and sent an investigator 
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to Eutaw, but no arrests were made. The citizens of the town either refused to testify out of fear 
of the Klan, or did not testify to protect the Klan. Either way this event represents the same 
problems the federal government had in prosecuting crimes. It became difficult to get any 
witnesses to talk because testifying became so dangerous, especially when the federal 
government could not promise protection from retaliation by the Klan.
2
  
In October 1870, a riot involving a Republican rally and simultaneous Democratic rally 
broke out in Eutaw, Alabama. Violence between Republicans and Democrats was not unusual, 
but the scale of the riot was unique. The seemingly premeditated attack on the part of the 
Democrats provided a perfect opportunity to prosecute violators using the new Enforcement Act. 
The attorney general for the federal government, John Southworth, struggled to prove the 
premeditation, conspiracy, and collusion of the Democratic rioters. The federal circuit judge 
William B. Woods sought advice in defining the Enforcement Act within the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Ultimately Judge Woods, with the advice of Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. 
Bradley, defined citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, and 
justified their protection via the Enforcement Act. His interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was unprecedented and broad in its understanding.  U.S. v Hall was the first time 
the federal courts applied the rights protected by the Bill of Rights to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its privileges and immunities clause. This meant that through the 
Fourteenth Amendment blacks had the same rights granted to all citizens by the Bill of Rights. 
Without the link of the Fourteenth Amendment blacks may have been free, but they did not 
possess the same rights as white citizens. The failure of the jury to convict the defendants made 
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appeal impossible, and the case could not be certified to the Supreme Court on a division of 
opinion, thus the opportunity to have the highest court in the country define the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to include the Bill of Rights, as Judge Woods 
had done, ultimately failed.
3
 Unfortunately, the Court decided to hear a case decidedly less 
violent and political compared to U.S. v Hall.  
The prosecutions throughout the South under the new Enforcement Act began strong. 
The Justice Department throughout the South tried and convicted many members of the Ku Klux 
Klan. But the officials in charge of bringing these men to trial quickly became overwhelmed. 
Southerners insisted the Fourteenth Amendment did not encompass protections afforded by the 
Bill of Rights and thus could not be used to prosecute violators. The Supreme Court had not yet 
had the opportunity to hear a case involving the Enforcement Act and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and therefore could not weigh in on the legitimacy.  
The Supreme Court eventually defined the term privileges and immunities in the 
Slaughterhouse cases (1873) where the Court ruled unfavorably for the rights of black citizens. 
In the Slaughterhouse cases the Supreme Court ruled that state citizenship and federal citizenship 
are two separate things. One does not have to be dependent on the other. Therefore it was up to 
the states to protect the rights of its citizens. This was a major blow for supporters of a broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court further emasculated the 
Fourteenth Amendment in U.S. v Cruikshank (1876), which severed the connection even more 
between the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause and the Bill of Rights. 
The Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment only protected citizens against state action, not 
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the actions of individuals. Therefore any Klan activity or political violence that was not state 
sponsored could not be prosecuted by the federal government. The Court also decreed that 
because the charges filed against the defendants did not explicitly state that the massacre was 
race based then the charges were invalid. Clearly, a crime was committed but unless it was a race 
based crime it was a state-level crime, not a federal crime. Proving race in federal court turned 
out to be virtually impossible.  As a result of both the Slaughterhouse cases and Cruikshank, 
black citizens were left with nowhere to turn. The states and the federal government both refused 
to protect their rights. It would be almost another century until society could move past the 
Courts’ decisions. Had the Supreme Court heard the Eutaw Rioters’ case the outcome of their 
decision may have been different, and the catastrophic course of Reconstruction could have been 
altered. Because U.S. v Hall was a more political trial than Slaughterhouse the differing events 
and views of the participants may have influenced the Supreme Court justices’ opinions, 
especially because the Slaughterhouse precedent would not have blocked a broader 
interpretation.  
 Eutaw itself provided a lens through which to view the legal battles of Reconstruction, 
before they became national battles. By looking at Eutaw and the actions of its citizens, 
historians can view Reconstruction on a smaller and more personal scale. This microscopic view 
of history provides historians evidence and reasons why Reconstruction failed, and what could 
have changed the ultimate outcome. One piece of evidence is United States v Hall. The Hall case 
provides historians an alternative view of the legal battles of Reconstruction, which could have 
steered the federal courts and thus the nation in a direction more beneficial to the freed people 
and to egalitarian goals embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment.  
124 
Eutaw provided the perfect storm of events for the riot that resulted in the federal court 
case United States v Hall. This lower-level court case became the basis on which a broad 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment was based. This court case was the first instance in 
which the Bill of Rights was applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. With this case the 
broad scope of this new Reconstruction Amendment had the potential to set a precedent which 
would alter the course of Reconstruction. Because of the fierce southern resolve to maintain the 
status quo and the limited views of the Supreme Court, U.S. v Hall remains a missed opportunity 
for the United States courts.  
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